可转债与企业全要素生产率

解维敏, 郭佳璐, 张恒鑫

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (10) : 2787-2806.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (10) : 2787-2806. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2023-0077
论文

可转债与企业全要素生产率

    解维敏1,2, 郭佳璐1, 张恒鑫1
作者信息 +

Convertible bonds and firm's total factor productivity

    XIE Weimin1,2, GUO Jialu1, ZHANG Hengxin1
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

提升全要素生产率是促进经济高质量发展、 全面建设社会主义现代化强国的关键举措. 本文利用多期双重差分模型考察可转债对企业全要素生产率的影响及作用机制. 研究发现, 可转债能够显著提升企业全要素生产率. 作用机制检验发现, 可转债通过缓解融资约束与优化资源配置两条路径提高全要素生产率. 异质性分析表明, 偏重债性的可转债对全要素生产率的提升作用更明显. 并且, 在外部监督程度较高的企业与金融发展水平较低的地区, 可转债对全要素生产率的促进作用更强. 本文为可转债经济后果的研究领域补充了来自中国资本市场的经验证据, 拓展了金融发展与经济增长领域的研究文献, 对推动我国金融工具创新、 促进经济高质量发展具有重要的启示意义.

Abstract

Enhancing total factor productivity is a key initiative to promote high-quality economic development and build a strong socialist modern state comprehensively. We examine the impact of convertible bonds on firm's total factor productivity and the corresponding mechanism based on a multi-period difference-in-differences model. We find that convertible bonds can significantly increase firm's total factor productivity. The mechanism tests show that convertible bonds can improve total factor productivity by alleviating financing constraints and optimizing resource allocation. The heterogeneity tests show that debt-like convertible bonds have a more significant impact on total factor productivity. Moreover, the contribution of convertible bonds to total factor productivity is more significant in firms with higher external monitoring and regions with lower financial development. Our paper adds empirical evidence on the economic consequences of convertible bonds from the Chinese capital market and complements the research framework in the field of financial development and economic growth, which has important implications for promoting innovation in financial instruments and high-quality economic development in China.

关键词

可转债 / 全要素生产率 / 融资约束 / 资源配置

Key words

convertible bonds / total factor productivity / financing constraints / resource allocation

引用本文

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解维敏 , 郭佳璐 , 张恒鑫. 可转债与企业全要素生产率. 系统工程理论与实践, 2023, 43(10): 2787-2806 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2023-0077
XIE Weimin , GUO Jialu , ZHANG Hengxin. Convertible bonds and firm's total factor productivity. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2023, 43(10): 2787-2806 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2023-0077
中图分类号： F832.51   

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基金

辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目重点攻关项目(LJKZZ20220123);国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(22FGLB074);辽宁省社会科学规划基金重点建设学科项目(L23ZD023)
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