基于二维Hotelling模型,构建同时考虑平台与商家差异化的博弈模型,探讨强势平台排他策略选择的原因以及影响.研究表明:首先,强势平台存在两种排他动机,分别为“垄断驱动-排他”和“差异化驱动-排他”.强势平台较低的佣金、平台间较低的横向差异化水平、较高的纵向差异化水平以及产品间较高的横向差异化水平均会强化“垄断驱动-排他”,弱化“差异化驱动-排他”.其次,对弱势平台而言,强势平台的“差异化驱动-排他”对其同样有利.弱势平台可以通过适当降低佣金、增加平台间的横向差异化程度、降低平台间的纵向差异化程度,来避免“垄断驱动-排他”的出现.最后,激烈的产品间竞争能够激励强势平台的“差异化驱动-排他”,降低产品间的竞争水平,进而提升商家收益.研究结论有助于厘清强势平台排他策略的驱动因素以及区分排他策略对各方的不同影响,对强势平台的监管和平台行业的反垄断具有重要意义.
Abstract
Based on the two-dimensional Hotelling model, this paper builds a game model that simultaneously considers the differentiation of platforms and merchants, to explore the adoption of different exclusive strategies by dominant platforms and the impacts of such strategy. The results show that, there are two types of exclusive strategies, namely monopoly-driven and differentiation-driven exclusivity. The monopoly-driven exclusivity can be promoted by low commission rates of strong platform, low horizontal differentiation between platforms, high vertical differentiation between platforms, and high horizontal differentiation between products; Otherwise, the differentiation-driven exclusivity will be strengthened. Second, the differentiation-driven exclusivity is also beneficial for weak platforms. To avoid the monopoly-driven exclusivity, weak platforms can increase horizontal differentiation between platforms and reduce vertical differentiation or commission rates. Finally, fierce competition among merchants can stimulate the differentiation-driven exclusivity implemented by dominant platforms, which in turn reduces competition among merchants and improves their profits. Overall, the research clarifies the drivers of exclusivity strategy of dominant platforms and distinguishes the influences of different exclusivity strategies on both platforms and merchants, providing strong policy implications for the regulation of dominant platforms and anti-monopoly in the platform industry.
关键词
平台市场 /
排他策略 /
不对称竞争 /
反垄断
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Key words
platform market /
exclusive strategy /
asymmetric competition /
anti-monopoly
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71802036, 72272021); 辽宁省教育厅项目(LN2020J32)
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