在考虑实施回收目标责任制的再制造闭环供应链中, 制造商与零售商如何调整自身的再制造策略以实现利润最大化是其面临的重要决策问题. 针对由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统, 根据回收再利用责任承担主体的差异, 构建制造商再制造和零售商再制造两种再制造模式下的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型, 对比分析了不同模式的再制造绩效水平、环境影响及社会效益. 研究表明: 回收目标责任制的实施对再制造活动具有一定的促进作用, 较低的再制造成本可以为制造商/零售商带来显著收益; 严格的回收再利用目标可以有效提高再制造率, 降低新产品和再制造品对环境的影响并提高社会福利, 但也可能会对供应链成员的利润产生负面影响; 相较于零售商再制造模式, 制造商再制造模式能获得更好的环境和社会绩效.
Abstract
In the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of remanufacturing by considering collection target responsibility system (CTRS), how to adjust their remanufacturing strategies to realize profit maximization is an important decision issue for the manufacturer and the retailer. Based on the different responsible parties of collection and reuse targets in a CLSC system comprised of a manufacturer and a retailer, two-period Stackelberg game-theoretic models under two remanufacturing models, i.e., manufacturer remanufacturing and retailer remanufacturing, was constructed. And the level of remanufacturing performance, environmental impacts as well as social welfare under different remanufacturing models were compared and analyzed. The results are as follows. The implementation of CTRS has positive effects on remanufacturing activities, and the relatively low remanufacturing cost can bring significant profits to the manufacturer/retailer. Stringent collection and reuse targets can be effective in increasing remanufacturing rates, reducing the environmental impact of new and remanufactured products as well as improving social welfare, but may also have the negative impact on the profits of supply chain members. Compared to the retailer remanufacturing model, the manufacturer remanufacturing model has better environmental and social performances.
关键词
回收目标责任制 /
闭环供应链 /
再制造模式 /
Stackelberg博弈
{{custom_keyword}} /
Key words
collection target responsibility system /
closed-loop supply chains /
remanufacturing models /
Stackelberg game
{{custom_keyword}} /
中图分类号：
F273
{{custom_clc.code}}
({{custom_clc.text}})
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
参考文献
[1] Pazoki M, Samarghandi H. Take-back regulation:Remanufacturing or eco-design?[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2020, 227:107674.
[2] 夏西强,朱庆华,赵森林.政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究[J].管理科学学报, 2017, 20(4):71-83. Xia X Q, Zhu Q H, Zhao S L. Competition mechanism of manufacture/remanufacture considering government subsidies[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2017, 20(4):71-83.
[3] Agrawal V V, Atasu A, Van Wassenhove L N. OM forum-New opportunities for operations management research in sustainability[J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management, 2019, 21(1):1-12.
[4] Yang L, Gao M, Feng L. Competition versus cooperation?Which is better in a remanufacturing supply chain considering blockchain[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2022, 165:102855.
[5] Zhao S, You Z, Zhu Q. Effects of asymmetric cost information on collection outsourcing of used products for remanufacturing[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2022, 162:102729.
[6] Sarkar B, Bhuniya S. A sustainable flexible manufacturing-remanufacturing model with improved service and green investment under variable demand[J]. Expert Systems with Applications, 2022, 202:117154.
[7] Luo R, Zhou L, Song Y, et al. Evaluating the impact of carbon tax policy on manufacturing and remanufacturing decisions in a closed-loop supply chain[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2022, 245:108408.
[8] Yan X, Han X. Optimal pricing and remanufacturing entry strategies of manufacturers in the presence of online reviews[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2022, 316(1):59-92.
[9] 孟丽君,黄祖庆,张宝友,等.闭环供应链再制品消费补贴政策模型分析[J].中国管理科学, 2021, 29(8):148-160. Meng L J, Huang Z Q, Zhang B Y, et al. Model of considering the government consumption-subsidy policy for consumer in the closed-loop supply chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(8):148-160.
[10] 常香云,潘婷,钟永光,等. EPR制度约束下生产-再制造竞争系统的双环境责任行为分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(4):905-918. Chang X Y, Pan T, Zhong Y G, et al. Analysis of dual environmental responsible behavior in producing-remanufacturing competition system under EPR policy[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2021, 41(4):905-918.
[11] 曹柬,胡强,吴晓波,等.基于EPR制度的政府与制造商激励契约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(3):610-621. Cao J, Hu Q, Wu X B, et al. Incentive mechanism between government and manufacturers based on EPR system[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2013, 33(3):610-621.
[12] Pazoki M, Zaccour G. A mechanism to promote product recovery and environmental performance[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, 274(2):601-614.
[13] 马祖军,胡书,代颖.政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J].中国管理科学, 2016, 24(1):82-90. Ma Z J, Hu S, Dai Y. Decision models for a closed-loop supply chain with hybrid sale/collection channels for electrical and electronic equipment under government regulations[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(1):82-90.
[14] Wang W, Zhang Y, Zhang K, et al. Reward-penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 170:178-190.
[15] Atasu A, Van Wassenhove L N, Sarvary M. Efficient take-back legislation[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009, 18(3):243-258.
[16] Atasu A, Ozdemir O, Van Wassenhove L N. Stakeholder perspectives on e-waste take-back legislation[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(2):382-396.
[17] Chen Y, Li B, Zhang G, et al. Quantity and collection decisions of the remanufacturing enterprise under both the take-back and carbon emission capacity regulations[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2020, 141:102032.
[18] Esenduran G, Kemahlioglu-Ziya E, Swaminathan J M. Impact of take-back regulation on the remanufacturing industry[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2017, 26(5):924-944.
[19] Wang Q, Li B, Chen B, et al. Implication of take-back and carbon emission capacity regulations on remanufacturing in a competitive market[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021, 325:129231.
[20] Wang Z, Wang Y, Liu Z, et al. Strategic management of product recovery and its environmental impact[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2021, 59(20):6104-6124.
[21] 曹柬,赵韵雯,吴思思,等.考虑专利许可及政府规制的再制造博弈[J].管理科学学报, 2020, 23(3):1-23. Cao J, Zhao Y W, Wu S S, et al. Remanufacturing game with patent protection and government regulation[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2020, 23(3):1-23.
[22] Yenipazarli A. Managing new and remanufactured products to mitigate environmental damage under emissions regulation[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 249(1):117-130.
{{custom_fnGroup.title_cn}}
脚注
{{custom_fn.content}}
基金
国家自然科学基金(71774072, 72072080); 江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX22_0386, KYCX 21_0393)
{{custom_fund}}
PDF(1599 KB)
