考虑风险关联的轨道交通PPP项目风险分担演化博弈模型

王军武, 余旭鹏

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (9) : 2391-2405.

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PDF(1341 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (9) : 2391-2405. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2019-2002-15
论文

考虑风险关联的轨道交通PPP项目风险分担演化博弈模型

    王军武, 余旭鹏
作者信息 +

Evolutionary game model of risk-sharing of rail transit PPP projects considering risk correlation

    WANG Junwu, YU Xupeng
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

为改善博弈论用于研究风险分担策略选择问题时忽略风险关联这一弊端,立足于演化博弈与风险关联视角,刻画应分担风险损失并引入到轨道交通PPP(public-private partnership)项目风险分担演化博弈模型中,根据复制动态方程,研究策略选择问题的演化过程,得到不同情形下的演化稳定策略.研究结果表明:风险分担系数、风险控制成本、基础收益等9个因素都会影响双方的策略选择,此外更重要的是,是否考虑风险关联可能会导致最终的演化结果有所不同.

Abstract

In order to improve the disadvantage of neglecting risk correlation when using game theory to study the selection of risk-sharing strategies, this paper, based on evolutionary game and risk correlation, describes the risk loss that should be shared and introduces it into the evolutionary game model of risk-sharing for rail transit public-private partnership (PPP) projects. According to the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary process of the strategy selection problem is studied, and the evolutionary stable strategies under different situations are obtained. The results show that nine factors, such as risk-sharing coefficient, risk control cost and basic income, will affect the strategic choice of both sides. More importantly, whether considering risk correlation or not may result in different final evolutionary results.

关键词

风险关联 / public-private partnership (PPP) / 风险分担 / 演化博弈

Key words

risk correlation / public-private partnership (PPP) / risk-sharing / evolutionary game

引用本文

导出引用
王军武 , 余旭鹏. 考虑风险关联的轨道交通PPP项目风险分担演化博弈模型. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(9): 2391-2405 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2019-2002-15
WANG Junwu , YU Xupeng. Evolutionary game model of risk-sharing of rail transit PPP projects considering risk correlation. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(9): 2391-2405 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2019-2002-15
中图分类号: C934   

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基金

国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0704301);武汉市城乡建设局科技计划项目(201943)
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