企业应急物资轮换更新行为与政府监管博弈分析

张琳, 田军, 党创寅, 冯英杰

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (10) : 2611-2619.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (10) : 2611-2619. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2018)10-2611-09
论文

企业应急物资轮换更新行为与政府监管博弈分析

    张琳1,2, 田军1, 党创寅2, 冯英杰2
作者信息 +

Game analysis of enterprises' replacement of emergency supplies and government's monitoring

    ZHANG Lin1,2, TIAN Jun1, DANG Chuangyin2, FENG Yingjie2
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

政府作为社会安全和社会福利保障的责任者，需要监管企业合规储备和轮换更新应急物资与设备的行为，但常常因为受制于企业储备信息不透明而导致监管效果不理想.本文针对应急物资周期性轮换更新这一敏感问题，建立了政府和企业的博弈模型，分析了一类质量或性能随时间下降的应急物资和设备按期轮换更新行为的监管策略，采用基于经验学习的强化学习算法求得政企博弈均衡解.算例分析结果验证了经验学习方法解决这一类问题（道德风险问题）的有效性.通过对比分析不同社会损失水平下的企业轮换更新行为和政府监管模式，进一步提出了相应的应对措施，从而对于这一问题的有效解决，提供了较好的管理启示.

Abstract

Government, who has a primary stake in social safety and welfare, undertakes the task of monitoring enterprises to make sure that they reserve and replace emergency supplies and equipment as required. Nevertheless, the reality is unsatisfactory, which is caused by the hidden information about the reserves' quality and performance. This paper considers a kind of emergency supplies and equipment that are needed to be replaced periodically to guarantee their usability and availability. A government-enterprise game model is established to analyze the enterprise's shirking behaviors and the government's monitoring strategies. The experience based equilibria are generated from a reinforcement learning algorithm. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of utilizing the experience-learning method to solve this kind of moral hazard problem. This study further puts forward managerial implications by analyzing enterprise's replacement strategies and government's monitoring patterns when the enterprise faces different levels of social losses.

关键词

应急物资 / 轮换更新 / 质量监管 / 博弈均衡 / 强化学习

Key words

emergency supplies / replacement / quality monitoring / game equilibria / reinforcement learning

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张琳 , 田军 , 党创寅 , 冯英杰. 企业应急物资轮换更新行为与政府监管博弈分析. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(10): 2611-2619 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)10-2611-09
ZHANG Lin , TIAN Jun , DANG Chuangyin , FENG Yingjie. Game analysis of enterprises' replacement of emergency supplies and government's monitoring. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(10): 2611-2619 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)10-2611-09
中图分类号： F224.9   

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基金

国家自然科学基金重大项目（71390331）；国家自然科学基金（71171157）
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