恐怖袭击事件中博弈双方高度不对称和存在认知差异,误对策方法提供了合适的分析框架.本文运用误对策分析方法剖析 了恐怖袭击事件中政府反恐力量与恐怖分子的认知差异,并分析了不同情境下策略冲突的平衡结局.由于双方认知偏差 可能导致不存在纯策略纳什均衡,而混合均衡进一步加大了策略的不确定性,安全策略采取“安全第一”的原则使决策者避免最大风险, 相对于纳什均衡更合适作为存在认知差异的误对策问题的均衡分析方法.在实践操作角度上,恐怖袭击二阶误对策模型的平衡 结局为恐怖分子发动的恐怖袭击行动将被挫败,因此提出提高反恐效能的政策建议,即发动社会民众提供反恐情报和预警线索, 提高民众反恐意识.
Abstract
Terrorism attack has the asymmetry between both parties and the cognitive difference, so hypergame analysis provides a suitable analytical framework. This paper applies the hypergame analysis method to the cognitive difference in terrorism attack between government anti-terrorism forces and terrorists, and analyzes the equilibrium outcome of strategies conflict among the different scenarios. Because the cognitive difference of two parties maybe result that the hypergame model has not pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and mix equilibrium further increases the strategic uncertainty, security strategy takes the "safety-first" principle to avoid the maximal risk, which is more suitable to analyze the hypergame problem with cognitive difference than Nash equilibrium, as a new equilibrium analysis method. From the viewpoint of practical operation, the equilibrium outcome of the second-order hypergame model of terrorism attack shows that the terrorism attack should be frustrated. The paper provides some advices to improve the anti-terrorism policy efficiency by the extended analysis of hypergame model, which is government encourages the public to provide the intelligences and warnings, improve the anti-terrorism awareness of the public.
关键词
误对策 /
恐怖主义 /
认知差异 /
安全策略 /
情报预警
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Key words
hypergame /
terrorism /
cognitive difference /
security strategy /
early warning intelligence
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71271045, 71571033);东北财经大学学科建设 支持计划特色学科项目(XKT-201411);东北财经大学科研创新团队培育与扶持计划国际合作研究支持项目(DUFE2015GY03)
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