
Dynamic incentive contracts for venture capital with diversified task relationships in continuous time
Dahai LI, Huan WANG, Tao DING, Liang LIANG
Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2025, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (5) : 1553-1571.
Dynamic incentive contracts for venture capital with diversified task relationships in continuous time
diversified strategy / dynamic contract / principal-agent theory / venture capital {{custom_keyword}} /
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