Research on the co-opetitive relationship of symbiosis network for “urban mineral” utilization based on chain-to-chain competition

HUANG Renhui, GAO Ming

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2025, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (3) : 886-906.

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PDF(666 KB)
Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2025, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (3) : 886-906. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2023-2248

Research on the co-opetitive relationship of symbiosis network for “urban mineral” utilization based on chain-to-chain competition

  • HUANG Renhui1,2, GAO Ming1,2
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Abstract

Clarifying the evolution of the co-opetitive relationships among stakeholders of the symbiosis network for "urban mineral" utilization has great significance in enhancing the efficiency of resource utilization. Based on the perspective of reverse supply chain and reverse supply chain competition, six sets of modes under different government subsidy conditions and different channel structure are constructed. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of various cooperation modes, the paper examines the paths of vertical structure strategies. After that, this paper explores how horizontal stakeholder relationships influence vertical cooperative-competitive behaviors. And the stability of the conclusions are validated through a series of extended mode analysis and numerical simulation. Our results show that, 1) The symbiosis network will maximize the economic, environmental and social value of "urban mineral" utilization when both chain choose the centralized decision structure; 2) Regarding dominant strategies, it's possible for both supply chains to adopt either a centralized or decentralized decision mode as an equilibrium strategy. This is because horizontal competition among recyclers can affect the degree of symbiosis with upstream remanufacturers, thus influencing the overall supply chain profit and the choice of vertical channel structure strategy; 3) Higher levels of symbiosis aren't always better, excessive symbiosis can weaken the positive externalities of a centralized decision structure; 4) Government subsidy policies can optimize the resource utilization efficiency of urban minerals. what's more, subsidies to remanufacturers rather than recyclers are more likely to enhance social welfare. However, the effectiveness of subsidy policies will invalid in the later stages of symbiosis. Therefore, regulating the degree of competition among recyclers, maintaining the degree of symbiosis in an appropriate range, and formulating proper incentive policies can help the centralized decision structure to achieve Pareto improvements of the overall profit of the supply chain, so as to promote the symbiosis from a competitive relationship to a stable cooperation state.

Key words

“urban mineral” / symbiosis network / chain-to-chain competition / co-opetitive relationship / game

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HUANG Renhui , GAO Ming. Research on the co-opetitive relationship of symbiosis network for “urban mineral” utilization based on chain-to-chain competition. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2025, 45(3): 886-906 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2023-2248

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Funding

National Social Science Foundation of China: Research on the Driving Mechanism of Integrated Development of "Urban Mineral" Utilization Industry Chain (24CGL095)
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