Signal game model of intelligent joint defense security inspection in urban rail transit hubs

LI Delong, LIU Dehai

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (12) : 3363-3380.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (12) : 3363-3380. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2021-2715

Signal game model of intelligent joint defense security inspection in urban rail transit hubs

  • LI Delong1, LIU Dehai2
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Abstract

In the construction process of the new urban rail transit intelligent security inspection mode integrating face recognition technology and white list security inspection system, there still exist some scientific difficulties such as designing security inspection network based on joint defense mechanism, designing security inspection network security evaluation mechanism and designing security inspection signal strategy considering the attackers' emotion. Firstly, this paper proposes a two-level joint defense model of urban rail transit hubs, which takes the face recognition system as the first level and the white list channel as the second level. Then, a signaling game model of terrorist and riot related security inspection considering the attacker's emotion is constructed, and three refined Bayesian equilibrium paths considering efficiency and safety and the optimal signal release strategy of the security inspection departments are obtained. The study finds that the greater the success rate of attackers avoiding face recognition through camouflage strategy, the more the security inspection departments should strengthen the detection ability for contraband, rather than continuously improve the joint defense ability for passenger identity attributes. The penetration strategy of attackers into the white list channel or ordinary channel directly affects the joint defense strategy of the security inspection departments. When the white list channel is selected, the efficiency of alarm response time and the level of information synchronization complement each other; On the contrary, the efficiency of alarm response time is complementary to the safety of ordinary channels. The formulation of security inspection signal strategy should fully consider the attackers' emotion, the proportion of low-capacity security inspection departments, the attackers' belief in the proportion of low-capacity security inspection departments, etc. for example, when the proportion of low-capacity security inspection departments is relatively low, the security inspection departments have the premise of releasing separated signals, otherwise they should release high-capacity mixed signals uniformly.

Key words

security inspection / signaling game / counter-terrorism / face recognition / white list system

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LI Delong , LIU Dehai. Signal game model of intelligent joint defense security inspection in urban rail transit hubs. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(12): 3363-3380 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2021-2715

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Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China (71874024, 71971045); Natural Science Foundation of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China (2022QN07003); Resource Utilization and Environmental Protection Coordinated Development Academician Expert Workstation in the North of China (2021NCDYSZJGZZ-001); Program for Innovative Research Team in Universities of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China (NMGIRT2202)
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