Economic new normal, pollution prevention and government regulation: Evolutionary game model of environmental emergencies

SONG Minxue, LIU Dehai, YIN Weiwei

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (6) : 1454-1464.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (6) : 1454-1464. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2019-2338

Economic new normal, pollution prevention and government regulation: Evolutionary game model of environmental emergencies

  • SONG Minxue1, LIU Dehai1, YIN Weiwei2
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Abstract

Promoting greater progress in pollution prevention and control is one of the three major battles to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects. Under the economic new normal, local governments are faced with the balance between environmental protection and stable growth and employment. Considering social stable pressure from mass protests around the environmental pollution event, the traditional enterprises face the pressure of environmental protection and transformation and development in the background of the supply-side reform, this paper constructs a spontaneous evolutionary game model between the surrounding people and enterprises, and then discusses the controlled evolutionary process under the regulation of the government. Through evolutionary equilibrium analysis and case study, the periodic fluctuation of pollution discharge and surrounding public protest behavior is explained. In order to achieve the only equilibrium of {accept, undertake social responsibility}, the government needs to implement the appropriate environmental regulation intensity range. The larger the enterprise's production turnover, the more room for the government to implement environmental regulation policies. This study provides beneficial reference for the government to achieve high-quality development and employment protection win-win situation.

Key words

government regulation / mass event / evolutionary game / environmental pollution / economic new normal

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SONG Minxue , LIU Dehai , YIN Weiwei. Economic new normal, pollution prevention and government regulation: Evolutionary game model of environmental emergencies. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(6): 1454-1464 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2019-2338

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Funding

National Key Research and Development Plan "Public Security Risk Prevention & Control and Emergency Technical Equipment" Key Special Project (2018YFC0807500); National Natural Science Foundation of China (71874024, 71571033, 71571035)
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