The game analysis on transnational investment social political risk prevention and control of multinational enterprises considering the perspective of social responsibility

CHEN Jingquan, WANG Yongling, ZHANG Jing

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (1) : 147-162.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (1) : 147-162. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2019-2205

The game analysis on transnational investment social political risk prevention and control of multinational enterprises considering the perspective of social responsibility

  • CHEN Jingquan1, WANG Yongling2, ZHANG Jing2
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Abstract

The implementation of social responsibility has significant effect on political risk prevention and control in host countries. However, under the complicated and volatile social background of host countries, transnational corporations may either be criticized for involving too much in fulfilling their social responsibility or lose the opportunity of getting further cooperation because of their “insufficient” performance. Therefore, the decision-making on social responsibility performance has been extensively concerned as a prominent challenge for transnational corporations. From the perspective of implementing social responsibility, this paper portrayed various cooperation strategies between host countries and transnational corporations by studying on incentive contract, restraining contract and non-discrimination contract, and constructed differential game models on political risk prevention and control for the foreign investment reciprocity of transnational corporations. The research shows that the political environment stability in host country has significant impact on mutual profit and path selection on optimal agreement. For transnational enterprises, small reputation decay rate makes incentive contract the optimal choice in short term cooperation, and non-discrimination contract performed better than others in long term cooperation, while complete restraining contract has the worst effect. However, transnational enterprises, which can inefficiently fulfilled their responsibility, may be immune to incomplete restraining contract. When reputation decay rate gets higher, incentive contract is still optimum, while complete restraining contract, which remain to be the worst, may even erode the invested capital of the corporation.

Key words

transnational investment risk prevention and control / social political risk / social responsibility / differential game

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CHEN Jingquan , WANG Yongling , ZHANG Jing. The game analysis on transnational investment social political risk prevention and control of multinational enterprises considering the perspective of social responsibility. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(1): 147-162 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2019-2205

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Funding

The Key Program of National Social Science Foundation of China (18AGJ003); Humanities and Social Sciences Planning Fund Project of Ministry of Education of China (16YJA790006); China Postdoctoral Science Fund Project (2016M590171); Scientific Research Foundation of the Education Department of Liaoning Province, China (LN2020Z02)
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