Analysis on the efficient allocation of public assets and budget management based on evolutionary game theory

YAN Peisheng, WANG Xianjia, ZHANG Qing

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (11) : 2872-2884.

PDF(1175 KB)
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院期刊网
PDF(1175 KB)
Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (11) : 2872-2884. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2019-1822-13

Analysis on the efficient allocation of public assets and budget management based on evolutionary game theory

  • YAN Peisheng1, WANG Xianjia2,3, ZHANG Qing4
Author information +
History +

Abstract

The asymmetry information between financial sector and budget units can easily lead to inefficient allocation and inefficient utility during the process of public asset allocation and budget management．We analyze the evolution process of asset allocation and budget management and study the incentive effect of reputation and the constraint effect of supervision by using evolutionary game theory and method．We analyze the interaction mechanism between the financial sectors' strategy and the budget units' strategy, and evolutionary equilibriums of financial sector and budget units are compared under static punishment mechanism and dynamic punishment mechanism. Our research finds that the incentive effects of reputation is effective for the high cost of budget unit, and the constraint effect of supervision is effective for low cost budget unit. Dynamic punishment mechanism is better than static punishment mechanism, and the more the amount of punishment, the greater the probability supervision, the better the supervision effect.

Key words

public assets / department budget / evolutionary game theory

Cite this article

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

Download Citations
YAN Peisheng , WANG Xianjia , ZHANG Qing. Analysis on the efficient allocation of public assets and budget management based on evolutionary game theory. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(11): 2872-2884 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2019-1822-13

References

[1] Crozier M. The bureaucratic phenomenon[M]. Chicago:Chicago University Press, 1964.
[2] Prendergast C. The limits of bureaucratic efficiency[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111(5):929-958.
[3] Ho A T K. From performance budgeting to performance budget management:Theory and practice[J]. Public Administration Review, 2018, 78(5):748-758.
[4] 中华人民共和国财政部令第35号. 《行政单位国有资产管理暂行办法》[Z]. 2006年5月30日.
[5] 中华人民共和国财政部令第36号. 《事业单位国有资产管理暂行办法》[Z]. 2006年5月30日.
[6] 马蔡琛, 沈雁寒. 公共预算绩效提升的博弈分析——基于利益相关方互动影响的考察[J]. 云南财经大学学报, 2012(6):3-10.Ma C C, Shen Y H. Game analysis of the improvement of public budget performance-Based on the study of interactive influence among stakeholders[J]. Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, 2012(6):3-10.
[7] 马蔡琛, 袁娇. 公共预算决策及时性的动态均衡分析[J]. 经济与管理研究, 2017, 38(6):84-95.Ma C C, Yuan J. Dynamic equilibrium analysis on the timeliness of public budget decision[J]. Research on Economics and Management, 2017, 38(6):84-95.
[8] 王奎泉,石磊. 财政监督的博弈分析比较及制度优化——以浙江省为例[J]. 财政研究, 2015(3):79-83.Wang K Q, Shi L. Game analysis and system optimization of financial supervision-Based on the case study from Zhejiang province[J]. Public Finance Research, 2015(3):79-83.
[9] 张青, 严培胜. 公共资产有效配置的机制设计[J]. 制度经济学研究, 2014, 45(3):130-141.Zhang Q, Yan P S. On the mechanism design of efficient allocation of public assets[J]. Research of Institutional Economics, 2014, 45(3):130-141.
[10] 严培胜, 张青. 公共资产预算配置的拍卖机制设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(5):273-279.Yan P S, Zhang Q. On mechanism design of auction in public asset budgeting[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(5):273-279.
[11] 吴俊培, 程文辉. 基于不完全信息博弈模型的预算效率激励机制设计[J]. 财政研究, 2018(11):71-83.Wu J P, Cheng W H. Design of budget efficiency incentive mechanism based on games of incomplete information[J]. Public Finance Research, 2018(11):71-83.
[12] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3):637-666.
[13] Samuelson L. Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection[M]. Cambridge:MIT Press, 1997.
[14] 潘峰, 西宝, 王琳. 基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(6):1393-1404.Pan F, Xi B, Wang L. Analysis on environmental regulation strategy of local government based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(6):1393-1404.
[15] 刘伟, 夏立秋, 王一雷. 动态惩罚机制下互联网金融平台行为及监管策略的演化博弈分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2017, 37(5):1113-1122.Liu W, Xia L Q, Wang Y L. Analysis on the behavior of internet finance platform and regulation strategy under dynamic punishment mechanism based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(5):1113-1122.
[16] 王先甲, 吕少杰, 全吉. 产品售后服务捆绑销售与营销策略演化[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(7):1740-1749.Wang X J, Lü S J, Quan J. Product after-sales service bundling and marketing strategy evolution[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(7):1740-1749.
[17] 郑君君, 韩笑, 邹祖绪, 等. IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析[J]. 管理科学学报, 2012, 15(2):72-82.zheng J J, Han X, Zou Z X, et al. Analysis on venture capitalists' strategies in IPO market based on evolutionary game[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2012, 15(2):72-82.
[18] 虞晓芬, 傅剑. 社会力量参与保障性安居工程演化博弈及政府规制[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2017, 37(12):3127-3136.Yu X F, Fu J. Evolutionary game and government regulation on social forces participating in affordable housing projects[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(12):3127-3136.
[19] Wang X J, Chen W M. The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit[J]. Chinese Physics B, 2019, 28(8):26-34.
[20] 全吉, 储育青, 王先甲. 具有惩罚策略的公共物品博弈与合作演化[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(1):141-149.Quan J, Chu Y Q, Wang X J. Public goods with punishment and the evolution of cooperation[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(1):141-149.

Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China (71871171); National Social Science Foundation of China (18BJY064)
PDF(1175 KB)

540

Accesses

0

Citation

Detail
Sections
Recommended

/

〈 〉