Contract structure analysis of supply chain under retailer's investment and loan linkage financing

LI Xin, YU Hui

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (4) : 933-950.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (4) : 933-950. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-2561-18

Contract structure analysis of supply chain under retailer's investment and loan linkage financing

  • LI Xin1,2, YU Hui2
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Abstract

In new normal period, investment and loan linkage financing plays an significance proposition to enhance the ability and willingness of financial institutions to serve the real economy. Reasonable supply chain contract structure is a fundamental measure to promote the deep integration of financial capital and supply chain, and to prevent risks in the financial system. This paper depicts the new characteristics of enterprise credit reconstruction and operation decision transfer, established a wholesale price (revenue sharing) contract model under the retailer's investment and loan linkage financing and explore the selection mechanism of contract structure and efficiency improvement space. The key finding is that the chosen mechanism of supply chain contract structure depends on the comparison of transaction cost reduction (synergistic benefit) and supply chain cost in investment and loan linkage financing. In addition, the revenue sharing contract could coordinate supply chain members and financial institutions to achieve "Pareto improvement", and there is a "upside down" phenomenon between interest rate and effort cost disturbance risk.

Key words

contract structure / investment and loan linkage / retailer / supply chain

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LI Xin , YU Hui. Contract structure analysis of supply chain under retailer's investment and loan linkage financing. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(4): 933-950 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-2561-18

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Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China (71571024, 71872021); Humanities and Social Sciences Research Program Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (15YJA630058, 14YJA630087)
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