Study on regulation mechanism of default risk in crowdsourcing based on differential game theory

LIU Wei, DING Kaiwen, LIU Dehai

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (10) : 2559-2568.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (10) : 2559-2568. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0700-10

Study on regulation mechanism of default risk in crowdsourcing based on differential game theory

  • LIU Wei, DING Kaiwen, LIU Dehai
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the crowdsourcing system consisting of platform and participants, and constructs a model about supervising behavior of the platform and default behavior of the participants in crowdsourcing process based on differential game theory. We explore the different game strategies under independent decision-making, Stackelberg game with platform and the cooperative decision-making situations. The findings are the return of platform and participants as well as the overall return of crowdsourcing system increases from independent decision making to the Stackelberg game with platform incentive, and then to the cooperative decision-making situations. The crowdsourcing platform can reduce the participants' default risk by the incentive mechanism and affect the return rate of both parties by the regulatory mechanism, so as to select the optimal strategic behavior reasonably and achieve the Pareto improvement. In addition, we set the model parameter based on Zhubajie crowdsourcing platform as case, and do a numerical analysis to validate the theoretical model.

Key words

crowdsourcing / default risk / differential game

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LIU Wei , DING Kaiwen , LIU Dehai. Study on regulation mechanism of default risk in crowdsourcing based on differential game theory. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(10): 2559-2568 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0700-10

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Funding

Humanities and Social Sciences Research Program Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (17YJA630059); Scientific Research Foundation of Liaoning Provincial Department of Education (LN2016YB006); Scientific Research Foundation of Dongbei University of Finance & Economics (DUFE2017Y04); Foundation for Innovative Scholar of Liaoning Province (81)
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