The controller design for promoting the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma based on the non-uniform interaction rates

DONG Rui, WANG Xianjia, CHEN Lin

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2017, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (10) : 2582-2591.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2017, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (10) : 2582-2591. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2017)10-2582-10

The controller design for promoting the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma based on the non-uniform interaction rates

  • DONG Rui1,2, WANG Xianjia1, CHEN Lin1
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. The controls based on cooperation recognition and defection recognition are designed and the evolution paths of cooperation under different controls are analyzed. Under the control based on cooperation recognition, the population is divided into two parts:cooperation-subpopulation and cooperation-and-defection-subpopulation. Non-uniform interaction rates is defined as the probability of interaction between two players is dependent of their strategy. It can increase the interaction rates between two subpopulations with the same strategy. It promotes the evolution of cooperation by protecting cooperation. Under the other control, based on defection recognition, the evolution of cooperation is promoted by punishing defection. We find that the control based on cooperation recognition can promote cooperation when the cooperation rate is low. But cooperation can't become the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) under this control. The control based on the defection recognition can translate cooperation to ESS with highly initial cooperation rate, but defection will always be ESS. So we design a new control, called switching control. Based on these two controls, cooperation is translated to the only one ESS. The experiments show the affection of different switching control on the evolution path of cooperation.

Key words

prisoner's dilemma / evolutionary games / evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) / switching control / non-uniform interaction rates

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DONG Rui , WANG Xianjia , CHEN Lin. The controller design for promoting the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma based on the non-uniform interaction rates. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(10): 2582-2591 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2017)10-2582-10

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Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China (71231007, 71501149)
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