Based on the asymmetric time-to-build, operating costs, investment costs and government subsidies, this paper uses an asymmetric duopoly real option game model to construct an investment decision-making model of duopoly where one firm has mothballing options and the other does not. The paper discusses and analyzes three types of investment equilibrium, namely simultaneous, sequential and preemptive investment equilibrium, provides some enterprise investment strategies in different equilibrium situations, and analyzes their influences. The analyses show that the mothballing option can improve the firm's investment value; the investment threshold of the firm not having a mothballing option has a positive relationship with operating costs, investment costs, time-to-build and price fluctuation of the product, and is negatively related to government subsidies; the investment threshold of the firm having a mothballing option has a positive relationship with operating costs and price fluctuation of the product, and is negatively related to government subsidies when the government subsidies are lower than the quota and is positively related when the government subsidies are higher the quota, and has no obvious relationship with investment costs and time-to-build; the operating costs, government subsidies and price fluctuation have a greater influence on the follow investment threshold than on the lead investment threshold, and have a greater influence on the investment threshold of the firm that has no mothballing option than that of the firm that does.
Key words
mothballing option /
asymmetric duopoly /
option-game /
investment decision making
{{custom_keyword}} /
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
References
[1] 张国兴, 郭菊娥, 刘东霖. 建设时间和投资成本不对称的双寡头期权博弈模型[J]. 管理科学, 2008, 21(4): 75-81. Zhang Guoxing, Guo Jue, Liu Donglin. An asymmetric duopoly option game model under time-to-build and investment cost[J]. Journal of Management Science, 2008, 21(4): 75-81.
[2] Huisman K J M. Technology investment: A game theoretic real options approach[M]. Boston: Kluwer Academic Pub, 2001.
[3] 吴建祖, 宣慧玉.可暂停研发项目投资决策的实物期权方法[J].科技进步与对策, 2007, 24(2): 161-163.Wu Jianzu, Xuan Huiyu. Real options approach of the suspendable R&D project investment decision[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2007, 24(2): 161-163.
[4] Takashima R, Goto M, Kimura H, et al. Entry into the electricity market: Uncertainty, competition, and mothballing options[J]. Energy Economics, 2008, 30(4): 1809-1830.
[5] 张国兴, 郭菊娥, 宴文隽.拥有"暂停期权"的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型[J].运筹与管理, 2008, 3: 140-165.Zhang Guoxing, Guo Jue, Yan Wenjuan. An asymmetric duopoly investment game model based on mothballing option[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2008, 3: 140-165.
[6] Myers S C, Majd S. Calculating abandonment value using option pricing theory[R]. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management, 1983.
[7] Grenadier S R. Strategic exercise of options: Development cascades and overbuilding in real estate markets[J]. Journal of Finance, 1996, 51(5): 1653-1679.
[8] Pacheco-de-almeida G, Zemsky P. The effect of time-to-build on strategic investment under uncertainty[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 34(1): 166-182.
[9] 曹国华, 潘强.基于建设时间的企业投资期权博弈均衡分析[J].中国管理科学, 2006, 14(3): 135-141.Cao Guohua, Pan Qiang. Investment option-game equilibrium strategy analyses based on time-to-build[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, 14(3): 135-141.
[10] 王小柳, 张曙光.在投资项目时间有限情况下的期权博弈[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2011, 31(2): 247-251.Wang Xiaoliu, Zhang Shuguang. Option games in finite investment project life[J]. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2011, 31(2): 247-251.
[11] Spencer B J, Brander J A. International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 50(4): 707-722.
[12] D'Aspremont C, Jacquemin A. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(3): 641-642.
[13] Leahy D, Neary J. Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries[J]. American Economic Review, 1997, 87(4): 642-662.
[14] 孟卫东, 范波, 马国旺. 基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究[J]. 华东经济管理, 2011, 25(11): 95-98.Meng Weidong, Fan Bo, Ma Guowang. Research on government subsidy policy for R&D alliance based on technical risk[J]. East China Economic Management, 2011, 25(11): 95-98.
[15] 郭军华,李帮义,倪明. 双寡头再制造进入决策的演化博弈分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(2): 370-377.Guo Junhua, Li Bangyi, Ni Ming. Evolutionary game analysis of duopoly's remanufacturing entry decision[J]. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(2): 370-377.
[16] 郭晓旸,刘洪玉. 政府土地供应决策中等待期权的实证检验[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(11): 2787-2794.Guo Xiaoyang, Liu Hongyu. Empirical test of the government's waiting option in land transfer[J]. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(11): 2787-2794.
[17] 原博.风能发电与火力发电的发展潜力对比研究[D].保定: 华北电力大学, 2011.Yuan Bo. Research on contrasting the potential development of wind power and thermal power[D]. Baoding: North China Electric Power University, 2011.
[18] 朱磊.能源安全与气候变化背景下的能源投资建模与应用研究[D].合肥: 中国科学技术大学, 2011.Zhu Lei. Energy investment modeling and its applications under the background of energy security and climate change[D]. Hefei: University of Science and Technology of China, 2011.
{{custom_fnGroup.title_en}}
Footnotes
{{custom_fn.content}}
PDF(1009 KB)
