Research on the incentive mechanism for multi-task moral hazard in application service outsourcing

TANG Guo-feng, DAN Bin, SONG Han

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2013, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5) : 1175-1184.

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中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院期刊网
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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2013, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5) : 1175-1184. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2013)5-1175

Research on the incentive mechanism for multi-task moral hazard in application service outsourcing

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(5): 1175-1184 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2013)5-1175

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