Location of terror response facilities based on dynamic game of complete information

HAN Chuan-feng, MENG Ling-peng, ZHANG Chao, KONG Jing-jing

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2012, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2) : 366-372.

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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2012, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2) : 366-372. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2012)2-366

Location of terror response facilities based on dynamic game of complete information

  • HAN Chuan-feng, MENG Ling-peng, ZHANG Chao, KONG Jing-jing
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Abstract

Contraposed to the characteristic of location problem for the terror response facilities, we consider the responding time and the carrying time synthetically, taking full account of the loss caused by nuclear and biochemical terrorist attack and set up a noncooperate game model. One and fixed number of facilities are considered respectively, and the Nash equilibrium is given synchronously using genetic algorithms. A case study of Shanghai district shows that loss of the government could decrease efficiently by both establishing terror response facilities interactively and reducing the reaction time, and the more the facility quantity increases, the slower the slope becomes. This model reflects the strategy interaction between the government and the terrorists and is an effective method for facility location of terror response facilities.

Key words

terrorist attacks / facility location / complete information / game theory

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HAN Chuan-feng, MENG Ling-peng, ZHANG Chao, KONG Jing-jing. Location of terror response facilities based on dynamic game of complete information. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2012, 32(2): 366-372 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2012)2-366

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