Relational incentive contracts and double moral hazard in service outsourcing

SONG Han;DAN Bin;ZHANG Xu-mei

Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2010, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (11) : 1944-1953.

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中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院期刊网
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Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice ›› 2010, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (11) : 1944-1953. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2010)11-1944
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Relational incentive contracts and double moral hazard in service outsourcing

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2010, 30(11): 1944-1953 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2010)11-1944

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