控股股东股权质押、高管激励与股价波动

奚玉芹, 张凯歌, 胡金月, 金晨曦, 金永红, 杨晓光

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2024, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (3) : 813-835.

PDF(415 KB)
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院期刊网
PDF(415 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2024, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (3) : 813-835. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2022-1837
论文

控股股东股权质押、高管激励与股价波动

    奚玉芹1, 张凯歌2, 胡金月2, 金晨曦3, 金永红2, 杨晓光4
作者信息 +

Controlling shareholder equity pledges, executive incentives and stock price volatility

    XI Yuqin1, ZHANG Kaige2, HU Jinyue2, JIN Chenxi3, JIN Yonghong2, YANG Xiaoguang4
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

为避免股权被平仓的风险, 控股股东质押股权后应该有动机降低股价波动风险, 现有文献对此虽有探讨, 但结论并不一致, 而且对具体机制的探讨也不清楚. 本文从理论上分析企业控股股东股权质押与企业股价波动负相关关系及其具体机制与路径, 并选取2007年到2021年的A股上市公司数据进行实证检验. 研究发现:控股股东股权质押后, 公司的股价波动确实显著降低;为了维持短期股价稳定, 上市公司控股股东质押股权后, 会增加公司高管的短期薪酬, 无论是绝对数量还是相对比重;高管激励在控股股东股权质押与企业股价波动之间起着部分中介作用. 进一步研究表明, 控股股东进行股权质押对股价波动的平滑作用并不是通过提高公司业绩能力和盈余管理水平, 降低信息不对称性和大股东掏空来实现的. 异质性结果也说明了非国有控股的上市企业对控股股东进行股权质押的行为都更为敏感. 本文探究了控股股东股权质押对股价波动的作用及其机理, 从理论上对股价波动文献进行了补充, 并为外部投资者、金融机构和政府部门提出相应建议, 对提升上市公司的公司治理效率提供新的思路.

Abstract

In order to avoid the risk of being closed out, controlling shareholders should have an incentive to reduce the risk of share price volatility after pledging their equity, which has been explored in the existing literature but the conclusions are inconsistent and the specific mechanisms are unclear. This paper theoretically analyses the negative relationship between corporate controlling shareholder equity pledges and corporate share price volatility and its specific mechanisms and paths, and selects A-share listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2021 for empirical testing. It is found that: The share price volatility of a company does decrease significantly after controlling shareholders’ equity pledge; in order to maintain short-term share price stability, listed companies increase the short-term remuneration of company executives after controlling shareholders’ equity pledge, both in terms of absolute quantity and relative weighting; and executive incentives play a partially mediating role between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and corporate share price volatility. Further research shows that the smoothing effect of controlling shareholders in making equity pledges on share price volatility is not achieved by increasing the firm’s performance capabilities and surplus management levels, reducing information asymmetries and tunneling by large shareholders. The heterogeneous results also fully illustrate that non-state-controlled listed firms are more sensitive to equity pledges by controlling shareholders. This paper explores the role of controlling shareholders’ equity pledges on share price volatility and its mechanism, which theoretically complements the literature on share price volatility and provides corresponding suggestions for external investors, financial institutions and government departments, offering new ideas to enhance the effciency of corporate governance of listed companies.

关键词

控股股东 / 股权质押 / 高管激励 / 股价波动

Key words

controlling shareholder / equity pledge / executive incentive / stock price volatility

引用本文

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

导出引用
奚玉芹 , 张凯歌 , 胡金月 , 金晨曦 , 金永红 , 杨晓光. 控股股东股权质押、高管激励与股价波动. 系统工程理论与实践, 2024, 44(3): 813-835 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2022-1837
XI Yuqin , ZHANG Kaige , HU Jinyue , JIN Chenxi , JIN Yonghong , YANG Xiaoguang. Controlling shareholder equity pledges, executive incentives and stock price volatility. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2024, 44(3): 813-835 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2022-1837
中图分类号： F830.9   

参考文献

[1] 徐龙炳, 汪斌. 股权质押下的控股股东增持:"价值信号" 还是"行为信号"[J]. 金融研究, 2021(1):188-206. Xu L B, Wang B. Increased holdings of controlling shareholders under equity pledge:Value signal or behavioral signal?[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2021(1):188-206.
[2] 谢德仁, 郑登津, 崔宸瑜. 控股股东股权质押是潜在的"地雷" 吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J]. 管理世界, 2016(5):128-140. Xie D R, Zheng D J, Cui C Y. Is controlling shareholder's share pledge a potential "mine"?[J]. Journal of Management World, 2016(5):128-140.
[3] 汪先珍, 马成虎. 控股股东股权质押、内部占用及其经济后果——基于融资工具的理论视角[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(5):1146-1171. Wang X Z, Ma C H. Share pledging, expropriation incentives and economic consequences:A theoretical perspective[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(5):1146-1171.
[4] Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(2):225-264.
[5] 郑国坚, 林东杰, 林斌. 大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014, 17(9):72-87. Zheng G J, Lin D J, Lin B. Controlling shareholders' financial constraints, tunneling and firm value from the perspective of stock pledge[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2014, 17(9):72-87.
[6] 徐会超, 潘临, 张熙萌. 大股东股权质押与审计师选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 中国软科学, 2019(8):135-143. Xu H C, Pan L, Zhang X M. Stock rights pledging of blockholders and auditor choice-Evidence from China[J]. China Soft Science, 2019(8):135-143.
[7] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J, et al. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2002, 57(6):2741-2771.
[8] 徐莉萍, 关月琴, 辛宇. 控股股东股权质押与并购业绩承诺——基于市值管理视角的经验证据[J]. 中国工业经济, 2021(1):136-154. Xu L P, Guan Y Q, Xin Y. Controlling shareholder's share pledging and performance commitment in M&As-Empirical evidence from the market value management perspective[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2021(1):136-154.
[9] Johnson S, Boone P, Breach A, et al. Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 58(1):141-186.
[10] Petersen M A, Thiagarajan S R. Risk measurement and hedging:With and without derivatives[J]. Financial Managementt, 2000, 29(4):5-29.
[11] 王斌, 蔡安辉, 冯洋. 大股东股权质押、控制权转移风险与公司业绩[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(7):1762- 1773. Wang B, Cai A H, Feng Y. Stock rights pledging of the blockholders, controlling rights transferring risk and firm's performance[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(7):1762-1773.
[12] Johnson S, Porta R L, Lopez-De-Silanes F. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2):22-27.
[13] La Porta R. Lopez-de-silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2):471-517.
[14] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor protection and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1):3-27.
[15] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor protection and corporate valuation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57(3):1147-1170.
[16] Chen Y, Hu S Y. The controlling shareholder's personal leverage and firm performance[J]. Applied Economics, 2007, 39(8):1059-1075.
[17] 李旎, 郑国坚. 市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J]. 会计研究, 2015(5):42-49. Li N, Zheng G J. Stock pledge and expropriations of controlling shareholders motivating by market capitalization management[J]. Accounting Research, 2015(5):42-49.
[18] Zhou J, Li W, Yan Z, et al. Controlling shareholder share pledging and stock price crash risk:Evidence from China[J]. International Review of Financial Analysis, 2021, 77:101839.
[19] 刘霞, 刘善存, 张强. 公开信息披露对异质交易行为与市场质量的影响[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(7):1672- 1681. Liu X, Liu S C, Zhang Q. Implications of public information disclosure for strategic behaviors of heterogeneously informed traders and market quality[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(7):1672-1681.
[20] 田高良, 封华, 张亭. 风险承担、信息不透明与股价同步性[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(3):578-595. Tian G L, Feng H, Zhang T. Risk-taking, information opacity and stock price synchronicity[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(3):578-595.
[21] 李常青, 幸伟. 控股股东股权质押与上市公司信息披露[J]. 统计研究, 2017, 34(12):75-86. Li C Q, Xing W. The controlling shareholders share pledges and the information disclosure of listed companies[J]. Statistical Research, 2017, 34(12):75-86.
[22] 辛清泉, 孔东民, 郝颖. 公司透明度与股价波动性[J]. 金融研究, 2014(10):193-206. Xin Q Q, Kong D M, Hao Y. Transparency and stock return volatility[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2014(10):193-206.
[23] 王海芳, 张笑愚. 控股股东股权质押、投资者情绪与实体企业"脱实向虚"——基于迎合理论视角[J]. 经济管理, 2021, 43(8):157-176. Wang H F, Zhang X Y. Controlling shareholder equity pledge, investor sentiment and the financialization of real enterprises:Based on the perspective of catering theory[J]. Business and Management Journal, 2021, 43(8):157-176.
[24] Shleifer A, Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, 52(2):737-783.
[25] Conyon M J, He L. Executive compensation and corporate governance in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(4):1158-1175.
[26] Firth M, Fung P M Y, Rui O M, et al. Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006, 12(4):693-714.
[27] 张汉南, 孙世敏, 马智颖. 高管薪酬粘性形成机理研究:基于掏空视角[J]. 会计研究, 2019(4):65-73. Zhang H N, Sun S M, Ma Z Y. A study on the formation mechanism of senior executive compensation stickiness:From the perspective of tunneling[J]. Accounting Research, 2019(4):65-73.
[28] 李常青, 幸伟. 控股股东股权质押影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性吗?[J]. 经济管理, 2018, 40(5):157-174. Li C Q, Xing W. Does the controlling shareholder equity pledge affect executive Pay-For-Performance sensitivity?[J]. Business and Management Journal, 2018, 40(5):157-174.
[29] 陈日清, 王彤彤, 史永东. 大股东权力对我国上市公司业绩的影响研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(10):2505- 2518. Chen R Q, Wang T T, Shi Y D. The impact of the power of major shareholders on the listed firms performance[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(10):2505-2518.
[30] 刘星, 付强, 郝颖. 终极控制人代理、两权分离模式与控制权私利[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(1):75-85. Liu X, Fu Q, Hao Y. Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cashflow rights and private benefits of control[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(1):75-85.
[31] Kim O, Verrecchia R. The relation among disclosure, returns, and trading volume information[J]. Accounting Review, 2001, 76(4):633-654.
[32] Leone A J, Wu J S, Zinmerman J L, et al. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006, 42(1):167-192.
[33] 王谨乐, 史永东. 机构投资者、高管变更与股价波动[J]. 管理科学学报, 2018, 21(7):113-126. Wang J L, Shi Y D. Institutional investors, top management turnover and the fluctuation of stock price[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2018, 21(7):113-126.
[34] 钱爱民, 张晨宇. 股权质押与信息披露策略[J]. 会计研究, 2018(12):34-40. Qian A M, Zhang C Y. Share pledge and firms' voluntary disclosure[J]. Accounting Research, 2018(12):34-40.
[35] Hirst D E, Koonce L, Venkataraman S, et al. Management earnings forecasts:A review and framework[J]. Accounting Horizons, 2008, 22(3):315-338.
[36] 郑森圭, 崔笑宁, 汪寿阳, 等. 基于动态基础薪酬的企业薪酬制度研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(4):958- 966. Zheng S G, Cui X N, Wang S Y, et al. Research on enterprise compensation system based on dynamic basis compensation[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(4):958-966.
[37] 陈宋生, 严文龙, 李文颖. 年报审计与薪酬契约优化[J]. 会计研究, 2020(10):177-192. Chen S S, Yan W L, Li W Y. Audit of annual financial report and compensation contract improvement[J]. Accounting Research, 2020(10):177-192.
[38] 李留闯, 田高良. 公司关系网络和高管薪酬:理论模型和实证[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(1):54-63. Li L C, Tian G L. Relationship network of firms and executive compensation:Theoretical model and empirical findings[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2014, 34(1):54-63.
[39] 梁上坤, 李烜博, 陈玥. 公司董事联结与薪酬契约参照——中国情境下的分析框架和经验证据[J]. 中国工业经济, 2019(6):154-172. Liang S K, Li X B, Chen Y. The board ties and the reference effect of compensation contract-Theory framework and empirical evidence in China[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2019(6):154-172.
[40] Baker G P, Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Compensation and incentives:Practice vs. theory[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1988, 43(3):593-616.
[41] 刘凤委, 孙铮, 李增泉. 政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2007(9):76-84. Liu F W, Sun Z, Li Z Q. Government influence, industry competition and compensation contract-Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Management World, 2007(9):76-84.
[42] 蒋涛, 刘梦宁. 市场化进程下高管薪酬契约的业绩指标选择[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(2):241-255. Jiang T, Liu M N. The choices of performance indexes of executive compensation contracts in the process of marketization[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(2):241-255.
[43] 陈邑早, 陈艳, 黄诗华, 等. 高管薪酬契约参照效应对公司股价同步性的影响[J]. 管理学报, 2023, 20(2):287-296. Chen Y Z, Chen Y, Huang S H, et al. Research on the influence of executives' compensation contract reference effect on the corporation stock price synchronicity[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2023, 20(2):287-296.
[44] Bloomfield M J. Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment:Evidence from revenue-based pay[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2021, 141(2):620-643.
[45] 文磊, 李宏兵. 疫情防控与股价波动:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(8):54-64. Wen L, Li H B. Epidemic control and stock price volatility:Empirical evidence from listed Chinese companies[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(8):54-64.
[46] 解维敏, 张恒鑫. 自主创新还是技术引进:业绩型股权激励与企业创新策略[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2023, 43(1):36-57. Xie W M, Zhang H X. Make or buy:Performance-vested equity incentives and firm innovation strategy[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2023, 43(1):36-57.
[47] 孙宸, 庄新田. 董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究[J]. 东北大学学报(自然科学版), 2021, 42(7):1049- 1056. Sun C, Zhuang X T. Empirical study on influence of directors' network position on executive compensation[J]. Journal of Northeastern University (Natural Science), 2021, 42(7):1049-1056.
[48] Pang C, Wang Y. Stock pledge, risk of losing control and corporate innovation[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2020, 60:101534.
[49] 李增福, 郑友环, 连玉君. 股权再融资、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控方式下的研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(2):49-56. Li Z F, Zheng Y H, Lian Y J. Equity refinancing, earnings management and the performance decline of China listed companies:Viewpoint from accruals and real activities manipulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2011, 19(2):49-56.
[50] Dechow P M, Sloan R G, Sweeney A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review, 1995, 70(2), 193-225.
[51] Ascioglu A, Hegde S, McDermott J. Auditor compensation, disclosure quality, and market liquidity:Evidence from the stock market[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2005, 24(4):325-354.
[52] 周开国, 李涛, 张燕. 董事会秘书与信息披露质量[J]. 金融研究, 2011(7):167-181. Zhou K G, Li T, Zhang Y. Board secretary and the quality of information disclosure[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2011(7):167-181.
[53] 侯晓红, 李琦, 罗炜. 大股东占款与上市公司盈利能力关系研究[J]. 会计研究, 2008(6):77-84. Hou X H, Li Q, Luo W. Firm profitability and embezzlement behavior of controlling shareholder[J]. Accounting Research, 2008(6):77-84.
[54] 李明, 叶勇. 媒体负面报道对控股股东掏空行为影响的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2016, 28(1):73-82. Li M, Ye Y. The influence of negative media coverage on tunneling of controlling shareholder:Evidence from China[J]. Management Review, 2016, 28(1):73-82.

基金

国家自然科学基金重大项目(72192800)
PDF(415 KB)

486

Accesses

0

Citation

Detail
段落导航
相关文章

/

〈 〉