不对称信息下权力结构对自有品牌引入的影响

刘 竞, 傅 科, 徐佳焱

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (8) : 2056-2075.

PDF(979 KB)
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院期刊网
PDF(979 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (8) : 2056-2075. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2020-2278
论文

不对称信息下权力结构对自有品牌引入的影响

    刘 竞1, 傅 科2, 徐佳焱2
作者信息 +

Impacts of power structure on the store brand entry with asymmetric information

    LIU Jing1, FU Ke2, XU Jiayan2
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

自有品牌引入问题在不同权力结构下得到了广泛的研究. 本文从需求信息不对称的角度综合考虑两种权力结构(零售商领导和制造商领导 )下零售商引入自有品牌问题的特点和相互之间的关系. 研究结果表明, 引入自有品牌对于制造商和零售商利润的变化在不同权力结构下有着不同的影响. 当需求信息在企业间存在差异时, 供应链成员作为市场领导者的先动优势可能会消失, 零售商和制造商作为市场追随者能够获得更高的利润. 最后, 从信息管理的角度发现, 市场参与者对于信息获取能力的偏好和供应链成员之间的信息共享在不同权力结构下也有着显著差异.

Abstract

Prior literature has studied extensively on store brand entry under different power structures between the national-brand manufacturer and the retailer. This paper considers the characteristic and the relationship between two alternative Stackelberg games (manufacturer-led and retailer-led) with store brand entry under an asymmetric demand scenario where the retailer possesses the private demand information. The results show that the impacts of the store brand on the players' profits under each Stackelberg games are different. In addition, when the information is asymmetric, the first-mover advantage for the firms may disappear and they can obtain more profits when acting as the follower. Finally, the players' preference for informational acquisition capability and the information sharing between firms also show some significant differences between different power structures.

关键词

自有品牌引入 / 权力结构 / 不对称信息

Key words

store brand entry / power structure / information asymmetry

引用本文

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

导出引用
刘 竞 , 傅 科 , 徐佳焱. 不对称信息下权力结构对自有品牌引入的影响. 系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(8): 2056-2075 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-2278
LIU Jing , FU Ke , XU Jiayan. Impacts of power structure on the store brand entry with asymmetric information. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(8): 2056-2075 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-2278
中图分类号： F224   

参考文献

[1] Pasternack B A. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities[J]. Marketing Science, 2008, 27(1):133-140.
[2] Private label manufacturers association. PLMA's 2016 private label yearbook[R]. 2016.
[3] Nielsen A C. Global private label report:The rise of the value-conscious shopper[R]. 2011.
[4] Ru J, Shi R, Zhang J. Does a store brand always hurt the manufacturer of a competing national brand?[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(2):272-286.
[5] El-Ansary A L, Stern L W. Power measurement in the distribution channel[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1972, 9(1):47-52.
[6] Shi R, Zhang J, Ru J. Impacts of power structure on supply chains with uncertain demand[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(5):1232-1249.
[7] Choi S C. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J]. Marketing Science, 1991, 10(4):271-296.
[8] Lee E, Staelin R. Vertical strategic interaction:Implications for channel pricing strategy[J]. Marketing Science, 1997, 16(3):185-207.
[9] McGuire T, Staelin R. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration[J]. Marketing Science, 1983, 2(2):161-191.
[10] Coughlan A T, Anderson E, Stern L W, et al. Marketing channels[M]. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2006.
[11] Choi S, Fredj K. Price competition and store competition:Store brands vs. national brand[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 225(1):166-178.
[12] Dunne D, Narasimhan C. The new appeal of private labels[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1999, 77(3):41-42.
[13] Bustillo M, Lawton C. Best buy expands private-label brands[EB/OL].[2019-8-2]. https://www.wsj.com/articles/-SB124078866665357525.
[14] Mills D E. Why retailers sell private labels[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1995, 4(3):509-528.
[15] Narasimhan C, Wilcox R T. Private labels and the channel relationship:A cross-category analysis[J]. The Journal of Business, 1998, 71(4):573-600.
[16] Corstjens M, Lal R. Building store loyalty through store brands[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 2000, 37(3):281-291.
[17] Raju J S, Sethuraman R, Dhar S K. The introduction and performance of store brands[J]. Management Science, 1995, 41(6):957-978.
[18] 刘竞, 傅科. 信息不对称下零售商自有品牌引入问题研究[J] 管理科学学报, 2019, 22(9):39-51.Liu J, Fu K. Store brand introduction under asymmetric demand information[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2019, 22(9):39-51.
[19] Sayman S, Hoch S J, Raju J S. Positioning of store brands[J]. Marketing Science, 2002, 21(4):378-397.
[20] Choi S C, Coughlan A T. Private label positioning:Quality versus feature differentiation from the national brand[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2006, 82(2):79-93.
[21] Nasser S, Turcic D, Narasimhan C. National brand's response to store brands:Throw in the towel or fight back?[J]. Marketing Science, 2013, 32(4):591-608.
[22] Wang Y, Niu B, Guo P. On the advantage of quantity leadership when outsourcing production to a competitive contract manufacturer[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(1):104-119.
[23] Li G, Li L, Liu M, et al. Impact of power structures in a subcontracting assembly system[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2020, 291(9):475-498.
[24] 范建昌, 付红, 李余辉, 等. 渠道权力结构与责任成本分担下供应链质量及协调研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(7):1767-1779.Fan J C, Fu H, Li Y H, et al. The research on quality and coordination in supply chains under channel power structures and liability cost sharing[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(7):1767-1779.
[25] Li Z, Gilbert S M, Lai G. Supplier encroachment under asymmetric information[J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(2):449-462.
[26] Li Z, Gilbert S M, Lai G. Supplier encroachment as an enhancement or a hindrance to nonlinear pricing[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(1):89-109.
[27] 蒋忠中, 赵金龙, 弋泽龙, 等. 灰色市场下考虑非对称信息的制造商质量披露及定价策略[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(7):1735-1751.Jiang Z Z, Zhao J L, Yi Z L, et al. Quality disclosure and pricing strategies of the manufacturer with asymmetric information under gray market[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(7):1735-1751.
[28] Shang W, Ha A Y, Tong S. Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J]. Management Science, 2015, 62(1):245-263.
[29] Guan X, Mantrala M, Bian Y. Strategic information management in a distribution channel[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2019, 95(1):42-56.
[30] Jiang B, Tian L, Xu Y, et al. To share or not to share:Demand forecast sharing in a distribution channel[J]. Marketing Science, 2016, 35(5):800-809.
[31] Miyaoka J, Hausman W H. How improved forecasts can degrade decentralized supply chains[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2008, 10(3):547-562.
[32] Taylor T A, Xiao W. Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer?[J]. Management Science, 2010, 56(9):1584-1598.
[33] Chen Y-J, Xiao W. Impact of reseller's forecasting accuracy on channel member performance[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(6):1075-1089.
[34] Zhang T, Zhu X, Gou Q. Demand forecasting and pricing decision with the entry of store brand under various information sharing scenarios[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 34(2):1740018.
[35] Cho I K, Kreps D M. Signaling games and stable equilibria[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102(2):179-221.
[36] Chung H, Lee E. Effect of store brand introduction on channel price leadership:An empirical investigation[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2018, 94(1):21-32.
[37] Sun X, Tang W, Chen J, et al. Manufacturer encroachment with production cost reduction under asymmetric information[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2019, 128:191-211.
[38] Fraser J. Collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment:How to create a supply chain advantage[R]. AMACON, New York, 2003.

基金

国家自然科学基金(71671192, 71721001, 71802197); 中山大学高校基本科研业务费专项资金(10000-31650524)
PDF(979 KB)

733

Accesses

0

Citation

Detail
段落导航
相关文章

/

〈 〉