PPP项目执行阶段控制权动态调整机制的演化博弈

张云华, 谢洪涛, 郑俊巍, 沈俊鑫

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (7) : 1784-1793.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (7) : 1784-1793. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2019-1994
论文

PPP项目执行阶段控制权动态调整机制的演化博弈

    张云华1, 谢洪涛2, 郑俊巍1, 沈俊鑫2
作者信息 +

Evolutionary game of dynamic adjustment mechanism of control rights in PPP project execution stage

    ZHANG Yunhua1, XIE Hongtao2, ZHENG Junwei1, SHEN Junxin2
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摘要

PPP (public-private partnership)项目进入执行阶段后,项目内外部环境变化必然导致相关利益主体资源和权利的再分配,控制权动态调整机制成为快速响应环境变化的必然选择.遵循权责对等、重罚轻奖原则,构建PPP项目控制权动态调整演化博弈模型,进而解析利益相关者策略选择演化规律及其关键敏感性因素.结果表明:PPP项目执行阶段控制权动态调整机制演化博弈系统具有复杂的路径依赖性,演化稳定状态取决于博弈双方策略选择的初始状态和关键参数调整机制;其中,投资者策略选择对控制权转移份额、合作剩余分享额度以及额外管理成本的变动较敏感;专业公司策略选择则对合作成本、合作剩余分享额度以及风险惩罚强度的变动较敏感.研究成果有助于完善项目治理理论,优化PPP项目控制权配置机制.

Abstract

After a PPP project enters the execution stage, changes in the internal and external environment of the project will inevitably lead to the redistribution of resources and rights of the relevant stakeholders, and the dynamic adjustment mechanism of control rights will become an inevitable choice for rapidly responding to environmental changes. Following the principles of equal rights and responsibilities, punishment rather than reward, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for dynamic adjustment of control rights in PPP projects, and then analyzes the evolution law of stakeholders' strategy choice and the key sensitive factors. The results indicate that the evolutionary game system of the dynamic adjustment mechanism of control rights in the PPP project execution stage has complex path dependence, and the stable state of evolution depends on the initial state and the adjustment mechanism of key parameters of both parties' strategy choice. Specifically, the strategy choice of investors is more sensitive to the changes of transfer share of control rights, the amount of cooperative surplus sharing and the additional management cost, while the strategy choice of professional companies is more sensitive to the changes of cooperation cost, the amount of cooperative surplus sharing and the intensity of risk penalty. The research results can help improve the project governance theory and optimize the control allocation mechanism of PPP projects.

关键词

PPP项目 / 控制权 / 动态调整机制 / 演化博弈 / 合作策略 / 利益相关者

Key words

public-private partnership (PPP) project / control rights / dynamic adjustment mechanism / evolutionary game / cooperative strategies / stakeholders

引用本文

导出引用
张云华 , 谢洪涛 , 郑俊巍 , 沈俊鑫. PPP项目执行阶段控制权动态调整机制的演化博弈. 系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(7): 1784-1793 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2019-1994
ZHANG Yunhua , XIE Hongtao , ZHENG Junwei , SHEN Junxin. Evolutionary game of dynamic adjustment mechanism of control rights in PPP project execution stage. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(7): 1784-1793 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2019-1994
中图分类号: C934   

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基金

教育部人文社会科学青年基金(19YJCZH260);昆明理工大学引进人才科研启动基金(KKSY201806020);国家自然科学基金(71761021,71964018)
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