政府补贴对风险投资项目的激励影响与福利分析研究

王宇, 朱翡, 罗悦

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (10) : 2549-2558.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (10) : 2549-2558. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-2148-10
论文

政府补贴对风险投资项目的激励影响与福利分析研究

    王宇, 朱翡, 罗悦
作者信息 +

A study of incentive influence of government subsidy on venture capital projects and its welfare analysis

    WANG Yu, ZHU Fei, LUO Yue
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摘要

初创企业与风险投资之间会存在双向道德风险问题，考虑到创新的外溢效应，本文从可转换优先股的角度分析了政府补贴对初创企业以及风险投资的微观激励影响，并且进一步从产业层面对比讨论了不同的扶持政策对整体社会福利的冲击.研究发现事后补贴与公共服务配套都能够实现有效激励，让风险投资和初创企业都选择社会最优的投入水平.政府的投资兜底政策尽管可以在某些情况下实现福利增进，但是总体来看无法解决激励不足的问题，甚至还会导致激励扭曲.与此同时，从整体产业层面来看公共配套服务的成本优势使其福利效果优于事后补贴，而政府的投资兜底政策依然有很强的不确定性.

Abstract

There exists the double moral hazard problem between the start-up and venture capital. Considering the spillover effect, this paper uses the framework of convertible preferred stock to study the influence of government subsidy on micro-motivation of both parties, and further compares social welfare among different support policies from the industrial perspective. Our study found that both ex post subsidy and public service policy can achieve effective motivation and make both venture capital and start-up take socially optimal efforts. Government's investment guarantee policy may lead to welfare improvement under some circumstances, but generally it can not solve the problem of insufficient incentive and even causes misaligned motivation for both parties. From the perspective of the whole industry, public service policy is superior to ex post subsidy in social improvement because of its lower cost, and there still is high uncertainty for government's investment guarantee policy.

关键词

风险投资 / 政府补贴 / 双向道德风险 / 合约设计 / 外溢效应

Key words

venture capital / government subsidy / double moral hazard / contract design / spillover effect

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王宇 , 朱翡 , 罗悦. 政府补贴对风险投资项目的激励影响与福利分析研究. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(10): 2549-2558 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-2148-10
WANG Yu , ZHU Fei , LUO Yue. A study of incentive influence of government subsidy on venture capital projects and its welfare analysis. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(10): 2549-2558 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-2148-10
中图分类号： F062.5   

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基金

教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目（15YJC790112）；国家社科基金一般项目（16BJL035）
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