本文研究政府在多目标碳配额分配条件下，行业内减排效率差异企业的最优减排技术投资策略.通过建立政府与企业的博弈模型，采用理想点法对多目标规划问题进行求解，分析碳配额政策对企业技术投资决策的影响.数值分析结果显示，在政府兼顾社会效益和经济效益的多目标配额分配条件下，低减排效率企业更有可能投资进行技术升级，以获得政府分配的更多配额，而高效率企业的投资动力不足.另外，技术投资成本下降或减排技术代际差异扩大时，行业内两企业投资升级技术的可能性增加.所得结论对于政府制定合适的碳配额分配政策，以及相关配套措施促进全行业的技术升级具有重要意义.
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal investment strategies of enterprises with different emission reduction efficiency under government's multi-objective carbon quota allocation. By establishing a game model among the government and the enterprises and using the ideal point method to solve the multi-objective programming problem, we analyze the impacts of quota allocation policy on the enterprises' decision-making of technology investment. The numerical analyzing results show that, under the multi-objective quota allocation that the government combines social benefits and economic benefits, the enterprises with low emission reduction efficiency are more likely to invest in technology upgrades to obtain more quotas allocated by the government, while the investment motivation of high-efficiency enterprises are insufficient. In addition, when the cost of technology investment declines or the intergenerational difference in emission reduction technologies expands, the possibility increases that all enterprises across the whole industry invest in upgrading technologies. These conclusions are of great significance for the government to formulate appropriate carbon quota allocation policies and corresponding supporting measures to promote industry-wide technology upgrades.
关键词
碳配额分配 /
碳减排技术 /
投资策略 /
多目标规划 /
博弈均衡
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Key words
carbon quota allocation /
carbon emission reduction technology /
investment strategy /
multi-objective planning /
game equilibrium
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中图分类号：
F830.59
X196
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目（71473031）；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目（14YJA790062）；四川省应用基础研究重点项目（2017JY0200）
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