供应链产品质量检查策略的比较研究

曹裕, 李青松, 胡韩莉

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (1) : 111-125.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (1) : 111-125. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0521-15
论文

供应链产品质量检查策略的比较研究

    曹裕, 李青松, 胡韩莉
作者信息 +

Comparative research on product quality inspection strategy in supply chain

    CAO Yu, LI Qingsong, HU Hanli
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

研究由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链,建立存在质量不确定与检查错误下的报童模型,比较分析全检、抽检、分批抽检以及组合策略在分散式与集中式供应链中对零售商订购决策与质量控制效率的影响.结果表明,次品率的增加会降低零售商订购产品的动因,但会增加组合策略下零售商的订购量与利润,同时对集中式供应链中全检策略下的零售商有利;比较策略可知,在分散式供应链中,若次品率较低,则分批抽检策略最优,而随着次品率的提高,组合策略会更优,而在集中式供应链中,全检策略最优;此外零售商质量控制策略的选择受到检查精度、责任成本、次品率阈值、抽检数量以及分批次数等诸多因素的影响,最优策略不尽相同,但不会改变零售商利润随次品率变化的趋势.

Abstract

This paper studies a supply chain with one supplier and one buyer and explores the effect of complete inspection, sampling inspection, batch sampling inspection and combination strategy on the product quality control based on newsvendor model considering quality uncertainty and inspection error in decentralized and centralized supply chain. The results show that the increase of defective rate will reduce the retailer to order products, but will increase the order quantities and profits of the retailer under the combination strategy; and it is beneficial for the retailer under the complete inspection strategy in the centralized supply chain. Through comparative analysis of strategies:in the decentralized supply chain, if the defective rate is low, batch sampling strategy is optimal, but the combination strategy will be better with the improvement of the defective rate; in the centralized supply chain, the complete inspection strategy will be better. In addition, the selection of retailer quality control strategy is influenced by many factors, and the optimal strategy is not the same, but these factors will not change the trend of retailers' profits to change with the defective rate.

关键词

质量控制 / 全检策略 / 抽检策略 / 分批抽检策略 / 组合策略

Key words

quality control / complete inspection strategy / sampling inspection strategy / batch sampling inspection strategy / combination strategy

引用本文

导出引用
曹裕 , 李青松 , 胡韩莉. 供应链产品质量检查策略的比较研究. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(1): 111-125 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0521-15
CAO Yu , LI Qingsong , HU Hanli. Comparative research on product quality inspection strategy in supply chain. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(1): 111-125 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0521-15
中图分类号: F273.2   

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基金

国家自然科学基金(71573281,71703122);国家社会科学基金(16BJY079);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(531107051061)
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