政治资源有助于城市商业银行“走出去”吗——来自城商行跨区域经营的经验证据

张敏, 童丽静, 张珂源

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (4) : 873-884.

PDF(840 KB)
PDF(840 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (4) : 873-884. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2018)04-0873-12
论文

政治资源有助于城市商业银行“走出去”吗——来自城商行跨区域经营的经验证据

    张敏1, 童丽静2, 张珂源1
作者信息 +

Do political resources facilitate geographic diversification?-Evidence from Chinese city commercial banks

    ZHANG Min1, TONG Lijing2, ZHANG Keyuan1
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

本文以2007-2015年我国城市商业银行为样本,研究了政治资源对城市商业银行跨区域经营的影响.实证研究结果表明,相比于没有政治资源的城市商业银行,拥有政治资源的城商行跨区域经营的程度更高;进一步研究发现,不同级别的政治资源对跨区域经营的推动作用存在差异,政治资源级别越高,其对城商行跨区域经营的推动作用越强;较高的市场化程度会弱化政治资源对城商行跨区域经营的影响.本文基于政治资源这一重要视角,深化了现有文献对城市商业银行跨区域经营影响因素的解释,并对城商行实现跨区域经营具有重要的参考价值.

Abstract

Based on a sample of Chinese city commercial banks during 2007 and 2015, this paper investigates the influence of political resources on banks' geographic diversification. The empirical results indicate that city commercial banks with political resources are more likely to set up trans-area branches than banks without political resources, and the effect is more pronounced in banks with high-level political resources. Further results show that the positive relation between political resources and geographic diversification is weakened when firms are located on areas with higher marketization level. Our paper serves as reference for the determinants of city commercial banks' geographic diversification, and provides city commercial banks with practical guidance on the realization of geographic diversification.

关键词

城市商业银行 / 跨区域经营 / 政治资源

Key words

city commercial bank / geographic diversification / political resources

引用本文

导出引用
张敏 , 童丽静 , 张珂源. 政治资源有助于城市商业银行“走出去”吗——来自城商行跨区域经营的经验证据. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(4): 873-884 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)04-0873-12
ZHANG Min , TONG Lijing , ZHANG Keyuan. Do political resources facilitate geographic diversification?-Evidence from Chinese city commercial banks. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(4): 873-884 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)04-0873-12
中图分类号: G20    G21    G28   

参考文献

[1] 鲍勤, 孙艳霞. 网络视角下的金融结构与金融风险传染[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(9):2202-2211. Bao Q, Sun Y X. Financial structure and financial contagion from the network perspective[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2014, 34(9):2202-2211.
[2] 夏立军, 陆铭, 余为政. 政企纽带与跨省投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2011(7):128-140. Xia L J, Lu M, Yu W Z. Political connections and inter-province investment:Evidence from Chinese listed firms[J]. Management World, 2011(7):128-140.
[3] Faccio M, Ronald W M, John J M. Political connections and corporate bailouts[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2006, 61:2597-2635.
[4] 罗党论, 唐清泉. 政治关系, 社会资本与政策资源获取:来自中国民营上市企业的经验证据[J]. 世界经济, 2009(7):84-96. Luo D L, Tang Q Q. Political connections, social capital, and policy resources:Evidence from Chinese private firms[J]. The Journal of World Economy, 2009(7):84-96.
[5] 张鹏凯. 政治关联, R&D与企业创新绩效——基于高新技术企业面板数据[J]. 郑州航空工业管理学院学报, 2015(6):49-55. Zhang P K. Political connections, R&D, and innovation performance[J]. Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, 2015(6):49-55.
[6] Boot A W A, Schmeits A. Market discipline and incentive problems in conglomerate firms with applications to banking[J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2000, 9:240-273.
[7] Deng S E, Elyasiani E. Geographic diversification, bank holding company value, and risk[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2008, 40(6):1217-1238.
[8] 张凯. 我国城市商业银行与地方经济发展关系研究——以徽商银行为例[J]. 郑州航空工业管理学院学报, 2012(4):141-144. Zhang K. Chinese commercial banks and local economy development[J]. Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, 2012(4):141-144.
[9] 陈一洪. 股权结构, 跨区域经营与经营绩效——基于城市商业银行随机前沿生产函数的分析[J]. 广东商学院学报, 2013(5):19-27. Chen Y H. Ownership structure, inter-province operation, and performance-Analysis based on the stochastic frontier production function of city commercial banks[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2013(5):19-27.
[10] 夏喆. 公司治理,跨区域经营与风险承担——通径分析视角下我国城市商业银行的行为选择[J]. 投资研究, 2016(3):26-42. Xia Z. Corporate governance, cross regional operation and risk taking[J]. Review of Investment Studies, 2016(3):26-42.
[11] 蔡卫星. 分支机构市场准入放松,跨区域经营与银行绩效[J]. 金融研究, 2016(6):127-141. Cai W X. Deregulation of branching restriction, geographical diversification, and bank performance[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2016(6):127-141.
[12] 王擎, 吴玮, 黄娟. 城市商业银行跨区域经营:信贷扩张, 风险水平及银行绩效[J]. 金融研究, 2012(1):141-153. Wang Q, Wu W, Huang J. Cross-area operation of commercial banks:Credit expansion, risk, and performance[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2012(1):141-153.
[13] Xu N, Xu X, Yuan Q. Political connections, financing friction, and corporate investment:Evidence from Chinese listed family firms[J]. European Financial Management, 2011, 19(4):675-702.
[14] 孙启伟, 刘天威. 跨区域发展战略对商业银行市场绩效影响的实证研究[J]. 金融发展研究, 2009(6):61-64. Sun Q W, Liu T W. Cross-area development strategy and commercial banks performance[J]. Journal of Financial Development Research, 2009(6):61-64.
[15] 周询, 周力, 王海涛. 资源禀赋与城商行跨区域经营——基于金融业数据的‘资源诅咒’假说检验[J]. 上海经济研究, 2015(9):60-69. Zhou X, Zhou L, Wang H T. Resource endowment and cross-area operation:A test of resource curse hypothesis[J]. Shanghai Journal of Economics, 2015(9):60-69.
[16] Lewellen O W. A pure financial rationale for the conglomerate merger[J]. Journal of Finance, 1971, 26:521-537.
[17] Jeffery S A. The impact of bank privatization on bank reform:Lessons from central and eastern Europe[R]. University of Michigan, Business School, Working Paper, 1996.
[18] Hughes J P, Mester L J. Bank capitalization and cost:Evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, 80(2):314-325.
[19] 曹凤岐, 谭先国. 城市商业银行的市场定位[J]. 农村金融研究, 2006(4):34-37. Cao F Q, Tan X G. The position of city commercial banks[J]. Rural Finance Research, 2006(4):34-37.
[20] 杨畅. 我国城市商业银行跨区域发展与经营效率提升研究——基于理论分析及美国的经验启示[J]. 浙江金融, 2001(8):48-52. Yang C. A study of commercial banks cross-area operation and performance:Theory and American evidence[J]. Zhejiang Finance, 2001(8):48-52.
[21] 易志强. 政府干预, 跨区域经营与城市商业银行治理[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2012(5):61-67+143. Yi Z Q. Government intervention, cross-section operation and cooperation governance of city commercial banks[J]. Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, 2012(5):61-67+143.
[22] 李梦雨, 魏熙晔. 经济下行背景下城市商业银行跨区域经营研究[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2016(10):39-47. Li M Y, Wei X Y. Research on geographic diversification of city commercial banks under the background of economic downturn[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2016(10):39-47.
[23] Kale P, Dyer J H, Singh H. Alliance capability, stock market response, and long-term alliance success:The role of the alliance function[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2002, 23(8):747-767.
[24] Demsetz R S, Strahan P E. Diversification, size, and risk at bank holding companies[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997, 29(3):300-313.
[25] DeLong G L. Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, 59(2):221-252.
[26] Brickley J A, Linck J S, Smith C W. Boundaries of the firm:Evidence from the banking industry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 70:351-383.
[27] Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3:305-360.
[28] Berger A N, De Young R. Technological progress and the geographic expansion of the banking industry[J]. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2006, 38:1483-1513.
[29] 冯曰欣, 姜白白, 许骁. 新形势下我国城市商业银行经营模式转型研究[J]. 山东财政学院学报, 2013(2):16-22. Feng Y X, Jiang B B, Xu X. The transition of Chinese commercial banks in a new environment[J]. Journal of Shandong University of Finance, 2013(2):16-22.
[30] Frynas J G, Mellahi K, Pigman G A. First mover advantages in international business and firm-specific political resources[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2006, 27(4):321-345.
[31] 于蔚, 汪淼军, 金祥荣. 政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J]. 经济研究, 2012(9):125-139. Yu W, Wang M J, Jin X R. Political connection and financing constraints:Information effect and resource effect[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2012(9):125-139.
[32] 李姝, 谢晓嫣. 民营企业的社会责任, 政治关联与债务融资——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014(6):30-40+95. Li S, Xie X Y. Corporate social responsibility, political relationship and debt financing of private enterprises:Evidence from Chinese capital market[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2014(6):30-40+95.
[33] 吴文锋, 吴冲锋, 芮萌. 中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J]. 管理世界, 2009(3):134-142. Wu W F, Wu C F, Rui M. Political connection and market valuation:Evidence from China individual-controlled listed firms[J]. Management World, 2009(3):134-142.
[34] 余明桂, 潘红波. 政治关系, 制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J]. 管理世界, 2008(8):9-21+39+187. Yu M G, Pan H B. The relationship between politics, institutional environments and private enterprises' access to bank loans[J]. Management World, 2008(8):9-21+39+187.
[35] 罗党论, 甄丽明. 民营控制, 政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2008(12):164-178. Luo D L, Zhen L M. Ownership controlling, political connections, and financial constraints:Evidence from Chinese private firms[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2008(12):164-178.
[36] 黄新建, 王婷. 政治关联, 经营业绩与贷款续新——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2011, 31(5):889-897. Huang X J, Wang T. Political connections, corporate performance and loan renewals:Evidence from the private listed firms[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2011, 31(5):889-897.
[37] 胡旭阳. 民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J]. 管理世界, 2006(5):107-113+141.
[38] 吴文锋, 吴冲锋, 刘晓薇. 中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值[J]. 经济研究, 2008(7):130-141. Wu W F, Wu C F, Liu X W. Political connection and market valuation:Evidence from China individual-controlled listed firms[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2008(7):130-141.
[39] 孔东民, 谭伟强. 最终控制人, 政府背景与企业投资[J]. 广东金融学院学报, 2011(1):12-22. Kong D M, Tan W Q. Ultimate controlling shareholders, political connection and the firms' investment[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance, 2011(1):12-22.
[40] 代光伦, 邓建平, 曾勇. 金融发展, 政府控制与融资约束[J]. 管理评论, 2012(5):21-29. Dai G L, Deng J P, Zeng Y. Financial development, government control and financial restriction[J]. Management Review, 2012(5):21-29.
[41] 张敏, 谢露, 马黎珺. 金融生态环境与商业银行的盈余质量——基于我国商业银行的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2015(5):117-131. Zhang M, Xie L, Ma L J. Financial ecological environment and commercial banks, earning quality:Evidence from Chinese commercial banks[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2015(5):117-131.
[42] 王秀丽, 鲍明明, 张龙天. 金融发展, 信贷行为与信贷效率——基于我国城市商业银行的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2014(7):94-108. Wang X L, Bao M M, Zhang L T. Financial development, lending behavior and lending efficiency:Empirical evidence based on Chinese city commercial banks[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2014(7):94-108.
[43] 王少飞, 孙铮, 张旭. 审计意见, 制度环境与融资约束[J]. 审计研究, 2009(2):1-10. Wang S F, Sun Z, Zhang X. Audit opinion, institutional characteristic and the financing restrain[J]. Auditing Research, 2009(2):1-10.
[44] 李黎, 莫长炜, 蓝海林. 政治资源对商业模式转型的影响——来自我国中小企业的证据[J]. 南开管理评论, 2015(5):28-41. Li L, Mo C W, Lan H L. The effect of political resource on business model transformation:An empirical research based on China's small and medium-sized enterprises[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2015(5):28-41.
[45] 袁建国, 后青松, 程晨. 企业政治资源的诅咒效应——基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察[J]. 管理世界, 2015(1):139-155.
[46] 宋增基, 袁茂, 徐叶琴. 中国上市银行独立董事制度的运行效率[J]. 金融论坛, 2007(11):49-54. Song Z J, Yuan M, Xu Y Q. The operating efficiency of independent director system in Chinese listed banks[J]. Finance Forum, 2007(11):49-54.
[47] 陈科, 宋增基. 战略投资者, 公司治理与银行绩效——对中国城市商业银行的实证研究[J]. 金融论坛, 2008(12):30-36. Chen K, Song Z J. Strategic investors, corporate governance and commercial bank's performance:An empirical study with examples of Chinese city commercial banks[J]. Finance Forum, 2008(12):30-36.
[48] 何维达, 于一. 外资进入与中国商业银行的风险承担[J]. 金融论坛, 2011(1):43-49. He W D, Yu Y. Foreign investment and Chinese commercial bank's risk-taking[J]. Finance Forum, 2011(1):43-49.
[49] 张敏, 刘颛, 张雯. 关联贷款与商业银行的薪酬契约——基于我国商业银行的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2012(5):108-122. Zhang M, Liu Z, Zhang W. Related lending and compensation contracting:Evidence from Chinese commercial banks[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2012(5):108-122.
[50] 翟胜宝, 陈紫薇, 刘亚萍. 银企关系与企业成本费用粘性[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(4):928-938. Zhai S B, Chen Z W, Liu Y P. Study on the relationship between the banking connection and the cost stickiness[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(4):928-938.
[51] 唐松, 孙铮. 政治关联,高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效[J]. 管理世界, 2014(5):93-105+187-188. Tang S, Sun Z. Political connections, executive compensation and performance[J]. Management World, 2014(5):93-105+187-188.
[52] 王小鲁, 樊纲, 余静文. 中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 上海:社会科学文献出版社, 2017. Wang X L, Fan G, Yu J W. A report of provincial marketization index in China (2016)[J]. Shanghai:Social Science Academic Press, 2017.
[53] 叶康涛, 陆正飞, 张志华. 独立董事能否抑制大股东掏空[J]. 经济研究, 2007(4):101-111. Ye K T, Lu Z F, Zhang Z H. Can independent directors deter the tunneling of large shareholders[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2007(4):101-111.

基金

中国人民大学面上项目(17XNB029)
PDF(840 KB)

925

Accesses

0

Citation

Detail

段落导航
相关文章

/