基于Shapley值法的快递自提补贴价格研究

周永圣, 曲冲冲, 李伯昊, 刘淑芹, 王珏

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (3) : 687-695.

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PDF(652 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (3) : 687-695. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2018)03-0687-09
论文

基于Shapley值法的快递自提补贴价格研究

    周永圣1, 曲冲冲1, 李伯昊2, 刘淑芹3, 王珏4
作者信息 +

Study on express subsidy price for consumer self-pick up based on Shapley value

    ZHOU Yongsheng1, QU Chongchong1, LI Bohao2, LIU Shuqin3, WANG Jue4
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

快递公司对自提消费者实施补贴政策可以迅速培养他们自提快递的习惯,从而推广自提模式的发展.因此,制定合理的补贴价格至关重要.本文以快递公司与便利店合作开展快递自提服务为研究对象,对补贴价格进行研究.运用Shapley值法构建了快递自提补贴价格模型,讨论了补贴价格在长期和短期不同情况下快递公司给予自提消费者的补贴价格公式,并明确了快递公司补贴的范围,价格等.最后通过算例分析验证了该模型的有效性和实用性.该模型的提出,对于通过以补贴行为来促进快递自提模式的发展具有重要的现实指导意义.

Abstract

Express company could cultivate customer picking up habit by implementing the policy that subsidizes to the customer who chooses to pick up their package. Such action will accelerate the development of self-pick up, which means draft a reasonable subsidy price important. To deep the research of subsidy price, this paper chose the self-pick up service between express enterprise and convenience store as the research object, used Shapley Value method to solve the subsidy model, discussed the short-term and long-term situation, got the formula of express self-pick up subsidy and clarified the range of subsidy. Through being tested by an example analysis, the formula verified its practical value in the end. This research has a significant guidance on the development of express self-pick up service by subsidizing.

关键词

快递自提 / Shapley值 / 补贴

Key words

express self-pick up / Shapley value / subsidy

引用本文

导出引用
周永圣 , 曲冲冲 , 李伯昊 , 刘淑芹 , 王珏. 基于Shapley值法的快递自提补贴价格研究. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(3): 687-695 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)03-0687-09
ZHOU Yongsheng , QU Chongchong , LI Bohao , LIU Shuqin , WANG Jue. Study on express subsidy price for consumer self-pick up based on Shapley value. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(3): 687-695 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2018)03-0687-09
中图分类号: F224.32   

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基金

北京市社会科学基金(15JGB093);国家科技支撑计划项目(2015BAD18B05);2018年北京工商大学研究生能力提升计划项目
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