认知层次与信念更新对博弈合作行为影响研究

郑君君, 邵祥民, 韩笑, 陈植元

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (1) : 113-120.

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PDF(626 KB)
系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (1) : 113-120. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2016)01-0113-08
论文

认知层次与信念更新对博弈合作行为影响研究

    郑君君, 邵祥民, 韩笑, 陈植元
作者信息 +

The research on the influence of cognitive hierarchy and belief update on the individuals' cooperative behavior of the game

    ZHENG Junjun, SHAO Xiangmin, HAN Xiao, CHEN Zhiyuan
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

将认知层次模型引入到虚拟博弈中, 考察具有异质认知层次的个体,其信念学习与更新规则对协调博弈最终均衡收敛的影响. 研究表明: 高阶认知层次局中人策略选择依赖于其关于低阶认知层次局中人策略选择的信念; 局中人策略选择与其关于对手初始策略选择的信念有关; 信念更新与博弈次数影响最终系统的合作水平.

Abstract

This thesis is to introduce cognitive hierarchy model into the fictitious play and to research the heterogeneous cognitive levels of individuals. Beliefs learning and update rules have an effect on the final equilibrium convergence of coordination game. Research shows that the high cognitive level player's strategy choice depends on the belief attached to the strategy choice of low order cognitive level; player's strategy choice is related to its belief involved in initial strategy choice of its opponent; belief update and game rounds affect the cooperation level of the final game system.

关键词

认知层次 / 信念学习 / 协调博弈 / 虚拟博弈 / 多重均衡

Key words

cognitive hierarchy / belief learning / coordination game / fictitious play / multiple equilibrium

引用本文

导出引用
郑君君 , 邵祥民 , 韩笑 , 陈植元. 认知层次与信念更新对博弈合作行为影响研究. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(1): 113-120 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2016)01-0113-08
ZHENG Junjun , SHAO Xiangmin , HAN Xiao , CHEN Zhiyuan. The research on the influence of cognitive hierarchy and belief update on the individuals' cooperative behavior of the game. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(1): 113-120 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2016)01-0113-08
中图分类号: O225   

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基金

国家自然科学基金(71371147, 71301121)
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