鼓励社会力量、社会资本参与公共文化服务体系建设,是十八届三中全会推动公共文化事业发展的新部署.尝试将实物期权与演化博弈相结合,分别讨论了公共文化服务市场中对称和不对称企业投资决策的演化均衡.首次以演化思想计算出基于沉没成本的投资临界值和投资壁垒,引入了政府补贴机制,并通过Matlab数值模拟验证结论.结果表明:沉没成本低于领先者投资临界值时,经营成本低的企业抢先投资;经营成本不对称的企业仍有可能采取同时投资策略;政府补贴和市场需求可以改变公共文化服务市场的进入门槛.
Abstract
Encouraging social forces, social capital to participate in the construction of public cultural service system, is a new deployment of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in order to promote public culture career development. It attempted to combine real options with evolutionary game theory, and discussed respectively the evolutionary equilibrium of symmetric and asymmetric firms investment decision in the public culture service market. Based on evolutionary game approach, investment threshold and barriers of sunk costs were computed firstly, and government subsidies as a exogenous variable was plugged into model. It conducted numerical analysis to verify the results by using Matlab software. It shows that if the sunk cost is lower than the leader investment threshold, firm with lower operating costs will invest first; it is possible that both firms that have asymmetric operating costs invest simultaneously; public cultural service market access threshold can be changed by government subsidies and market demand.
关键词
公共文化 /
投资临界值 /
投资壁垒 /
实物期权 /
演化博弈
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Key words
public culture /
investment threshold /
investment barriers /
real options /
evolutionary game
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中图分类号：
F282
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71272148);教育部高校博士点基金(20120032110039)
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