媒体监督与控股股东侵占——一个理论框架

孟庆斌, 汪昌云, 张永冀

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2015, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (8) : 1905-1917.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2015, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (8) : 1905-1917. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2015)8-1905
论文

媒体监督与控股股东侵占——一个理论框架

    孟庆斌1, 汪昌云2, 张永冀3,4
作者信息 +

Media supervision and large shareholder's expropriation: A theoretical framework

    MENG Qing-bin1, WANG Chang-yun2, ZHANG Yong-ji3,4
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文章历史 +

摘要

本文利用随机动态优化工具建立理论模型, 对媒体监督与控股股东侵占行为进行了研究. 结论表明, 控股股东侵占损害中小股东福利, 增大公司风险; 媒体监督对控股股东自身福利产生双重效应——财富分配效应和资产减值效应, 控股股东最优侵占比例取决于这两种效应的相对强弱; 提高媒体对控股股东侵占现象反应的敏感性, 增强曝光力度, 能够迫使控股股东更加重视自身声誉, 减少对中小股东利益的侵占; 控股股东与媒体的合谋会使其更加大胆地通过侵占中小股东利益, 提高自身福利.

Abstract

We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic model to investigate the effect of media on controlling shareholders and the related welfare implications. Our model shows that, under media supervision, controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior decreases the welfare of minority shareholders, and affects themselves through two offsetting effects: Wealth reallocation effect and value impairment effect. The equilibrium expropriating ratio (of firm value) depends on the tradeoff between these two effects. Moreover, media supervision's sensitivity and intensity will decrease controlling shareholders' equilibrium expropriation ratio. We further show that the collusion of controlling shareholders and media will make controlling shareholders' expropriation more aggressive, which brings in a larger welfare loss to minority shareholders.

关键词

媒体监督 / 控股股东侵占 / 福利 / 随机动态优化

Key words

media / controlling shareholders' expropriation / welfare / stochastic dynamic optimization

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孟庆斌 , 汪昌云 , 张永冀. 媒体监督与控股股东侵占——一个理论框架. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(8): 1905-1917 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2015)8-1905
MENG Qing-bin , WANG Chang-yun , ZHANG Yong-ji. Media supervision and large shareholder's expropriation: A theoretical framework. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(8): 1905-1917 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2015)8-1905
中图分类号： F830.91   

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基金

国家自然科学基金(31702156, 71272150, 71432008, 71102110)
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