针对我国环境规制政策的执行,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府、排污企业以及中央政府的决策演化过程,建立了地方政府与排污企业、地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略,分析了地方政府环境规制策略的影响因素.研究结果表明,地方政府政绩考核体系中环境质量指标的权重系数与经济发展指标的权重系数、环境规制执行成本、中央政府对地方政府的处罚额、排污收费费率、排污企业的治污成本与污染物削减量,都会对地方政府的环境规制策略产生影响.最后,为促进地方政府环境规制的严格执行提出了政策建议.
Abstract
For the implementation of environmental regulation in China, evolutionary process of decision among local government, enterprise and central government from the perspective of evolutionary game theory is discussed. The evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise is established, and the evolutionary game model between local government and central government as well. Behavioral evolutionary law and evolutionarily stable strategies are given according to replicator dynamics equation. The influencing factors of environmental regulation strategy of local government are analyzed. The results show that the environmental regulation strategy of the local government is affected by the weight coefficient of environmental quality index and economic development index in achievement assessment system, the cost of implementation of environmental regulation, the punishment of central government to local government, the rate of pollution discharge, the cost and the emission reductions of controlling pollution. Finally some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed.
关键词
环境规制 /
演化博弈 /
演化稳定策略 /
地方政府
{{custom_keyword}} /
Key words
environmental regulation /
evolutionary game /
evolutionarily stable strategy /
local government
{{custom_keyword}} /
中图分类号:
F224.32
{{custom_clc.code}}
({{custom_clc.text}})
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
参考文献
[1] 张征宇, 朱平芳.地方环境支出的实证研究[J].经济研究, 2010(5): 82-94.Zhang Zhengyu, Zhu Pingfang. Empirical study on heterogeneous dynamic path of local expenditure under inter-temporal budget constraints[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2010(5): 82-94.
[2] Moledina A A, Coggins J S, Polasky S, et al. Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2003, 45(2): 356-376.
[3] 邓峰.基于不完全执行污染排放管制的企业与政府博弈分析[J].预测, 2008, 27(1): 67-71.Deng Feng. Game between the government and enterprise under incompletely implemented regulations of pollution[J]. Forecasting, 2008, 27(1): 67-71.
[4] 蒙肖莲, 杜宽旗, 蔡淑琴.环境政策问题分析模型研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究, 2005, 22(5): 79-88.Meng Xiaolian, Du Kuanqi, Cai Shuqin. A study on the analysis model of environmental policy issues[J]. The Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics, 2005, 22(5): 79-88.
[5] 杨林, 高宏霞.基于经济视角下环境监管部门和厂商之间的博弈研究[J].统计与决策, 2012(21): 51-55.
[6] 王齐.政府管制与企业排污的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2004, 14(3): 119-122.Wang Qi. Game's analysis on government regulation and enterprise pollution[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2004, 14(3): 119-122.
[7] 张学刚, 钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2011, 21(2): 31-35.Zhang Xuegang, Zhong Maochu. Research about government regulation and the firm environment pollution under perspective of game theory[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2011, 21(2): 31-35.
[8] 张倩, 曲世友.环境规制下政府与企业环境行为的动态博弈与最优策略研究[J].预测, 2013, 32(4): 35-40.Zhang Qian, Qu Shiyou. Research on dynamic game between government and corporation environmental behavior and optimal strategies based on environmental regulation[J]. Forecasting, 2013, 32(4): 35-40.
[9] Barrett S. Strategic environmental policy and international trade[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54(3): 325-338.
[10] Kennedy P W. Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1994, 27(1): 49-63.
[11] Dungumaro W, Madulu F. Public participation in integrate water resources management: The case of Tanzania[J]. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 2003(28): 1009-1014.
[12] Yanase A. Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly[J]. Journal of Economics, 2009, 97(2): 121-140.
[13] Fujiwara K, Van Long N. Welfare effects of reducing home bias in government procurements: A dynamic contest model[J]. Review of Development Economics, 2012(16): 137-147.
[14] 崔亚飞, 刘小川.中国地方政府间环境污染治理策略的博弈分析——基于政府社会福利目标的视角[J].理论与改革, 2009(6): 62-65.Cui Yafei, Liu Xiaochuan. Environmental pollution control strategy game analysis between local governments based on the perspective of government social welfare goals[J]. Theory and Reform, 2009(6): 62-65.
[15] 刘洋, 万玉秋.跨区域环境治理中地方政府间的博弈分析[J].环境保护科学, 2010, 36(1): 34-36.Liu Yang, Wang Yuqiu. Game analysis on local governments in cross-region environmental regulation[J]. Environmental Protection Science, 2010, 36(1): 34-36.
[16] 易志斌.地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护[J].经济问题, 2011(1): 60-64.Yi Zhibin. Game theory analysis on competition among local governments and watershed water-environment protection[J]. On Economic Problems, 2011(1): 60-64.
[17] 张文彬, 张理#
[65] , 张可云.中国环境规制强度省际竞争形态及其演变——基于两区制空间Durbin固定效应模型的分析[J].管理世界, 2010(12): 34-44.Zhang Wenbin, Zhang Lifan, Zhang Keyun. China's provincial competition pattern and evolution of environmental regulation intensity analysis, based on spatial Durbin fixed effect model[J]. Management World, 2010(12): 34-44.
[18] 朱平芳, 张征宇, 姜国麟. FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究[J].经济研究, 2011(6): 133-145.Zhu Pingfang, Zhang Zhengyu, Jiang Guolin. Empirical study of the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation: An intergovernmental competition perspective[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2011(6): 133-145.
[19] 卢方元.环境污染问题的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2007, 27(9): 148-152.Lu Fangyuan. Evolutionary game analysis on environmental pollution problem[J]. Systems Engineering —— Theory & Practice, 2007, 27(9): 148-152.
[20] 申亮.我国环保监督机制问题研究:一个演化博弈理论的分析[J].管理评论, 2011, 23(8): 46-51.Shen Liang. A research on Chinese environment protection supervision mechanism: A evolutionary game theory analyses[J]. Management Review, 2011, 23(8): 46-51.
[21] 袁芳.减排约束下我国近海海域环境规制的演化博弈研究[J].生态经济, 2013(5): 29-34.Yuan Fang. Research on evolutionary game of offshore environmental regulation under emission-reduction constraint in China[J]. Ecological Economy, 2013(5): 29-34.
[22] 张红凤, 张细松.环境规制理论研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社, 2012.Zhang Hongfeng, Zhang Xisong. Study on the theory of environmental regulation[M]. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2012.
[23] 陈红枫.污染管制效率与交易成本[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社, 2011.Chen Hongfeng. Pollution regulation efficiency and transaction costs[M]. Beijing: China Environmental Science Press, 2011.
[24] Webull J. Evolutionary game theory[M]. Princeton: Princeton Press, 1995.
[25] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666.
[26] 周雪光, 练宏.政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型——以环境政策实施为例[J].中国社会科学, 2011(5): 80-96.Zhou Xueguang, Lian Hong. Bureaucratic bargaining in the Chinese government: The case of environmental policy implementation[J]. Social Sciences in China, 2011(5): 80-96.
{{custom_fnGroup.title_cn}}
脚注
{{custom_fn.content}}
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AGL010);国家自然科学基金(61074133)
{{custom_fund}}