考虑碳配额分配策略对具有不同单位产品碳排放水平企业的生产决策影响,构建双寡头竞争环境下的差异 化碳配额分配策略.通过建立基于差异化分配策略的古诺模型,研究了各种碳配额分配策略对具有不同单位产品碳排 放水平企业的利润、价格、产量和碳排放的影响.分析结果表明,市场规模和单位产品碳排放水平对减排措施的实施 效果具有显著影响;“侧重低排企业”的差异性配额分配策略优于其它配额分配策略,该策略能够在减少碳排放的 基础上更好地保护低排企业,激励企业积极降低单位产品碳排放水平、更好地应对国际 竞争; “侧重高排企业”或“均等”的碳配额分配策略虽能实现减排的目的,但会带来反向激励效用,从理论上验证我国当前策略的恰当和不足.
Abstract
Considering the influence of carbon emission quota allocation policy on the enterprise's production decision with different per unit product carbon emissions level, and by constructing the policies of differentiated carbon quotas under duopoly competition, this paper established the game model of Cournot based on differentiated allocation policies to study the influences of profit, price, production and carbon emissions about different levels enterprises of carbon emissions per unit of product. The results showed that the market size and the level of carbon emissions per unit of product has a positive impact on the implementation of emission reduction measures. The quota allocation policy focusing on the low-ranked companies is superior to the policy focusing on the others, the former would better protect low-ranked companies in the premise of reducing carbon emissions, encourage enterprises to actively reduce carbon emissions per unit of product, and to better respond to international competition. Although the latter would achieve the purpose of reducing emissions, it would bring back incentive effect. This paper theoretically verified the lack and proper of current strategies in China.
关键词
碳配额分配策略 /
碳排放水平 /
博弈 /
策略分析 /
激励
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Key words
carbon quota allocation policy /
carbon emissions /
game theory /
policy analysis /
incentive
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中图分类号：
O225
F272
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71172075, 71420107024);广东省软科学项目(2015A070704009, 2014A070703004)
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