成员间的相互信任是众包虚拟社区持续稳定发展的重要保证. 本文首先分析了各成员参与众包虚拟社区的动机,发现利益冲突会引起成员间欺诈现象的出现; 然后运用长期利益大于短期收益的机理,在惩罚机制模型的基础上,增加了道德风险因素,运用博弈理论分别建立了诚信保障机制和信誉评价机制模型,以达到约束单方或双方欺诈行为,保障良好交易环境的目的; 最后,比较了两种机制对众包虚拟社区成员各方收益的影响,结果表明: 当解答者的努力水平确定时,解答者在诚信保障机制下的收益总是大于信誉评价机制下的收益,当申诉费用过高时,解答者在信誉评价机制下的收益总是大于诚信保障机制下的收益. 并通过猪八戒网的案例分析,说明模型的有效性.
Abstract
If crowdsourcing wants to be developed steadily, the members are required to be involved in mutual trust and common progress with each other in the virtual community. Firstly, by analyzing the members' participation motivation and interest in virtual community, we spot the fraud motivation of participants. Secondly, based on the principle that long-term interests weigh more than short-term gains and the sanctioning mechanism model, and using the game theory method we establish game model of integrity safeguards mechanism and reputation evaluation mechanism respectively which under considering the moral hazard. The purpose is to employ the two mechanisms to constraint unilateral or bilateral fraud and to ensure good trading environment. Thirdly, through the two mechanisms comparative analysis, the study shows that the profits of solver are always greater in integrity safeguard mechanism than in reputation evaluation mechanism when the effort level of solver has been offered. However, the profits of solver are always greater in reputation evaluation mechanism than in integrity safeguard mechanism when the cost of appeals is too high. Finally, given the case analysis of "zhubajie", we illustrate the effectiveness of the model.
关键词
众包虚拟社区 /
惩罚机制 /
诚信保障机制 /
信誉评价机制 /
道德风险
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Key words
crowdsourcing virtual community /
sanctioning mechanism /
integrity safeguard mechanism /
reputation evaluation mechanism /
moral hazard
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中图分类号:
F279.2
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71071080);国家公派留学基金
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