在复杂合同的采购拍卖中,除价格外投标中还包含其他的质量属性,因价格和质量在量纲和数值上存在较大差异,使得投标策略择和赢者决策问题变得更加困难. 鉴于此,本文基于简单加权法,提出一种新的赢者决策方案,此方案不仅解决格和质量的量纲不统一和数值不可比的难题,而且还简化了评标的计算过程. 在新方案下,本文分别给出风险中性者和风险规避者的均衡投标策略,投标人数对均衡投标,投标者收益和采购者收益的影响. 结果显示: 投标者之间的竞争激烈程度对风险中性者和风险规避者的投标影响方向相同; 但是,相对于风险中性者,风险规避者将报出较低的价格和较高的质量; 其中,部分结广了传统单属性拍卖理论,部分结论较前人的研究成果更加贴近采购现实.
Abstract
In procurement auctions for complex contracts, bids involve quality attributes in addition to price. In such situation, the bidding strategy selected and the winner determination problem become more difficult because price and quality have different units and valuation scales. Based on the simple additive weighting method, this article proposes a new winner determination protocol. This protocol not only eliminates the problem caused by different measurement units of price and quality, but also transforms the different components of a bid into comparable scales, and simplifies the calculation of evaluating bids as well. Under our protocol, risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders' equilibrium bidding strategies are presented, and the effects of the number of bidders on bidding behavior, bidders' payoff and procurer's utility are examined, respectively. The result shows that: the competition has the same effect on risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders' bidding strategies; however, risk-averse bidders will offer a higher quality at a lower price than risk-neutral bidders; some results obtained generalize the price-only auction theory, and some results are nearer to the reality relative to the previous corresponding results.
关键词
多属性拍卖 /
投标策略 /
赢者决策 /
风险规避
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Key words
multi-attribute auction /
bidding strategy /
winner determination /
risk aversion
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71001097,71471039);对外经济贸易大学学术创新团队资助项目(CXTD4-01)
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