主导厂商定价之后, 外围厂商积极参与市场价格制定, 被称作为数量领先模型. 而在主导厂商定价后, 外围厂商仅仅作为价格接受者而不参与价格制定, 则被称作为价格领先模型. 通过比较不同外围厂商行为的两种模型, 发现当外围厂商参与市场价格确定时, 稳定的Cartel规模较大. 而当外围厂商不参与价格确定, 只是价格接受者时, Cartel规模较小. 最后用数值计算的方法对比检验了在两种模型下Cartel稳定值的大小.
Abstract
The fringe firms' participation in the setting of market price leads to the quantity leadership game, but if the fringe firms act as price takers, price leadership game happens. It compares the two models regarding the fringe firms' different behaviors and finds that the size of stable Cartel is larger in the quantity leadership model than that in the price leadership model. Finally, it employs numerical method to verify the size of stable Cartels in the two models.
关键词
数量领先 /
价格领先 /
Cartel /
稳定性
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Key words
quantity leadership /
price leadership /
Cartel /
stability
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中图分类号：
F062.9
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参考文献
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脚注
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基金
中央财经大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目; 国家自然科学基金(71073019); 中国科协(2009ZCYJ03); 上海市智能信息处理重点实验室(IIPL-09-019)
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