论文研究了两个销售商在拥有各自销售市场并面对相同供应商情况下的市场进入策略. 分析了单个企业进入对方市场和两个企业同时互相进入对方市场的情况, 得出了在不同情况下供应商的最优定价策略, 以及销售商们的采购数量和销售商们在各市场上输出的产品数量. 研究发现在大多数情况下销售商们的纳什均衡解为互相进入对方市场. 但是当两个市场的市场规模和价格弹性相近的时候, 销售商们面临''囚徒困境''---虽然互相进入对方的市场是市场进入博弈的纳什均衡, 但销售商的利润值均低于各自选择不进入对方市场时的收益.
Abstract
The paper studies two sellers' entry decisions when the two sellers have their own market but share the same supplier. The authors analyze the cases that one firm enters the other's market and the two firms enter each other's market, and derive the supplier's optimal pricing decision, the sellers' procurement quantities and firms' outputs in the two markets. The results show that in most conditions the Nash equilibrium for the sellers is to enter each other's market. However, when the market size and the price elasticity of the two markets are similar, the sellers face a “Prisoner Dilemma” -- The Nash equilibrium is to enter the other's market, but both sellers' profits are less than if they do not enter.
关键词
供应链 /
市场进入 /
博弈分析 /
纳什均衡
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Key words
supply chain /
market entry /
game analysis /
Nash equilibrium
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中图分类号：
F270
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参考文献
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(70901045, 70890082); 清华大学自主科研计划(20101081741)
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