引入忠实用户和活跃用户差异化转换成本, 拓展了非对称双寡头惠卖定价模型, 分析了在位售电商区域融合过程中优惠转换用户策略. 单期模型中, 区域分割和惠卖定价导致电价区域差别. 对转换用户的优惠价格与对方区域忠实、活跃用户份额及转换成本分布相关. 与统一定价竞争比较, 小公司活跃用户较少大公司活跃用户较多时, 小公司惠卖定价利润上升, 消费者剩余减少. 多期模型中, 活跃用户形成区域融合, 总市场份额趋近相等, 定价的长期趋势与活跃用户无关. 忠实用户多的公司对老用户定价比竞争对手更高, 对新用户优惠程度更大.
Abstract
The strategies of paying customers to switch (PCTS) between incumbents are analyzed during area convergence based on the model of asymmetric duopoly by introducing the loyal customers and the different switching cost. In a single-period model, the region segmentation and benefit price leads the different price between the areas. The offer to switching customers is relevant with the switching cost distribution and the share of active and loyal customers in the opponent region. In comparison with uniform pricing, the profit of the smaller-size electrical retailer increases in PCTS and the customer surplus decreases since the too few active customers in the small retailer and the too many ones in the large retailer. In a multi-period framework, the market segments of the active customers form the area convergence, the total market shares are equal and the price is not related to active customers in the long run. The retailer with more loyal customers sets a higher price to old users and a lower price to new ones than the opponent.
关键词
电力零售市场 /
惠卖定价 /
转换成本 /
活跃用户 /
忠实用户
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Key words
electrical retail market /
PCTS /
switching cost /
active customer /
loyal customer
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中图分类号：
F123.9
TM73
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(70833002, 71173036, 71103079); 教育部规划基金(11YJA630146); 江苏省社会科学基金 (10EY C021); 江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(2011SJB790016);江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(审计科学与技术预研究课题(YSXKKT21))
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