Service cooperation pricing strategy between manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chain
XIAO Jian1,2, DAN Bin1, ZHANG Xu-mei1
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1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;2. College of Mathematics and Statistics, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
In dual-channel supply chain, in order to avoid channel conflict and improve service efficiency, manufacturers outsource electronic channels' service to retailers. In the symmetric-information framework, the service-cooperation Stackelberg and Bertrand models between electronic channels and retailers in dual-channel supply chain are proposed. It shows that manufacturers and retailers' marginal service cost in electronic channels have great effect on the channels' demand and pricing decision. Manufacturers' service cost in electronic channels is positively associated with the retails channels' pricing. If the service quality of retail channels is higher than that of electronic channels, the service cost of retail channels is positively associated with the electronic channels' price. The price of both channels under Stackelberg competition is lower than that of Bertrand competition. Manufacturers always prefer the leadership of pricing. By numerical examples, retailers' choosing between Stackelberg competition and Bertrand competition is discussed, which is affected by the wholesale price and channels' service level.
XIAO Jian
, DAN Bin
, ZHANG Xu-mei. , {{custom_author.name_en}}.
Service cooperation pricing strategy between manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chain. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2010, 30(12): 2203-2211 https://doi.org/10.12011/1000-6788(2010)12-2203